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INTRODUCTION

Grutter v. Bollinger' and Gratz v. Bollinger,2 last term's
racial preference decisions, are among the most important civil
rights cases decided since Brown v. Board of Education.3 Not only
did these decisions clear up much of the confusion that had
surrounded the permissible use of racial preferences since the
Court's decision in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,4 decided a quarter of a century earlier, but also they
placed a judicial stamp of approval on a relatively broad use of
racial preferences by institutions of higher education. As such,
the decisions were a major victory for the proponents of the use of
racial preferences and a stunning defeat for the opponents.
Beyond any symbolic importance, these are decisions that will be
studied by university counsel and admissions officers throughout
the land and will almost certainly provide the blueprint for
university admissions processes for decades to come.
This Article will analyze the Grutter and Gratz opinions,
especially Justice O'Connor's important opinion for the majority
in Grutter,and will consider the significance of these decisions in
terms of university admissions policy, justifications for racial
preferences, and equal protection doctrine. The Article will
conclude that the Court's defense of the use of racial preferences
does not square well with the Powell opinion in Bakke on which it
relied so heavily. It will suggest that the Court could have offered
a more persuasive explanation for the result it reached but
probably felt precluded by precedent from doing so.

II. BACKGROUND
At some point during the late 1960s or early 1970s, many
universities and graduate schools began to grant preferences in
admission to various racial minority groups, apparently because
minority applicants did not have the grades or test scores to gain
admission in significant numbers absent such preferences.5 A
constitutional challenge to a preference program of this type was
1.

123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).

2.
3.
4.

123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
438 U.S. 265 (1978).

5.
See generally Claire Andre et al., Affirmative Action: Twenty-Five Years of
Controversy, 5 ISSUES IN ETHICS (Summer 1992) (discussing the history of affirmative
action and differing views on the topic), http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/iie

/v5n2/affirmative.html.
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first brought to the Supreme Court in 1974 in DeFunis v.
Odegaardj but the challenge was dismissed as moot when it
became clear that the plaintiff would graduate regardless of what
the Court held.7 Four years later in Bakke, a sixteen seat setaside for minorities enacted by the Medical School of the
University of California at Davis was invalidated by the Supreme
Court; however, five Justices agreed that race could be used as a
factor in the admissions process, though not as a quota or setaside.' In an opinion that no other Justice joined, Justice Powell
rejected three justifications for racial preferences offered by the
state: increasing the number of minority students, providing
more doctors to underserved minority communities, and
providing a remedy for past societal discrimination.9 Justice
Powell endorsed a fourth justification as a compelling state
interest-using race as one of many factors to create diversity in
the class for purposes of improving the learning environment."
Although Justice Powell was not speaking for any other Justice,
his diversity rationale, modeled after a plan employed by
Harvard College," was adopted by educational institutions
nationwide as the constitutionally appropriate method for using
racial preferences in university admissions processes. 2 Over
time, several Supreme Court cases, including Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education,3 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 4 and
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena," as well as Justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC,16 raised questions as to whether the Powell opinion in
Bakke was consistent with the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence.17
In 1996, in Hopwood v. Texas, the Fifth Circuit struck down
a racial preference policy that clearly did not comport with even a
generous reading of the Powell opinion in Bakke." In addition,
6.
416 U.S. 312 (1974).
Id. at 319-20.
7.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271-72, 279, 289-90, 319 (opinion of Powell, J.).
8.
9.
Id. at 271-72, 305-10 (opinion of Powell, J.).
10.
Id. at 311-15 (opinion of Powell, J.).
Id. at 321-24 (opinion of Powell, J.).
11.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2336 (2003).
12.
476 U.S. 267 (1986).
13.
14.
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
15.
497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
16.
See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944-46 (5th Cir. 1996); Lackland H. Bloom,
17.
Jr., Hopwood, Bakke and the Future of the DiversityJustification,29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1,
34-50 (1998).
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 940-44.
18.
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the Court held that the Powell diversity justification was not the
law and never had been. 9 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in a case involving a University of Washington Law
School preference program, disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's
conclusion that Bakke was not good law.2" The Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, affirming the invalidation of a racial
preference program employed by the University of Georgia,
largely agreed with the Fifth Circuit.2 '
Around that time, separate challenges to the racial
preference policies of the College of Literature, Science, and the
Arts at the University of Michigan and the University of
Michigan Law School (the "Law School") were brought in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan.2 The undergraduate admissions policy went through
several changes during the course of the litigation. 2 The version
ultimately upheld by the district court and invalidated by the
Supreme Court assigned points for a variety of diversifying
factors in addition to points assigned for traditional academic
indicators. 24 Twenty points were assigned for membership in
certain specified underrepresented racial groups.25 The record
indicated that, as a practical matter, the assignment of twenty
additional points was sufficient to lead to the admission of all
minimally qualified applicants from these groups.26 The district
court sustained the constitutionality of this program.2 7
The Law School considered a wide variety of diversifying
factors, including membership in one of three underrepresented
racial groups, in a nonmechanical, individualized manner.2" It
attempted to admit a "critical mass" of students from each of
these groups, although the size of the critical mass varied
significantly among the groups.29 The percentage of admitted
19.
See id. at 944.
20.
Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1191, 1200 & n.9 (9th Cir.
2000).
21.
See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234, 1244-45 (11th Cir. 2001)
(explaining that there was no Supreme Court majority in Bakke in support of the
proposition that diversity is a compelling state interest).
22.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 823-24 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd, 288
F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), affd, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (Law School); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 814-15 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev'd in part, 123 S. Ct. 2411
(2003) (College of Literature, Science, and the Arts).
23.
Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2418-20.
24. Id. at 2419-21, 2430-31.
25. Id. at 2419-20.
26. See id. at 2419.
27.
Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 831.
28.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2332, 2344 (2003).
29.
Id. at 2366-67 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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minorities remained relatively consistent from year to year,
although the percentage of those who actually attended did vary
somewhat. ° The district court held that this program was
unconstitutional.3 1
Both of these decisions were appealed to the Sixth Circuit.
Sitting en banc, it upheld the validity of the Law School's racial
preference program.32 It concluded that the Powell diversity
approach was good law and that the Law School had not
established an implicit quota.3 3 Writing for three additional
judges, Judge Boggs dissented, arguing that the Powell diversity
approach did not have the status of precedent and was not in fact
a compelling state interest, and that the Law School policy failed
strict scrutiny for lack of narrow tailoring. 3 The undergraduate
admissions case was argued to the Sixth Circuit, but an opinion
was not issued. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Law
School case, and at the urging of the plaintiff granted certiorari
to the district court in the undergraduate case as well. 35 Because
these decisions had the potential to put to rest the confusion
surrounding the legality of racial preferences in university
admissions, they attracted a great deal of attention; over one
hundred amicus briefs were filed. 0
Near the end of the term, the Court issued its opinions in
Grutter and Gratz, upholding the Michigan Law School policy by
a vote of 5-4 in an opinion written by Justice O'Connor and
invalidating the Michigan undergraduate program by a 6-3 vote
in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist.3 7 In Grutter,
the Court found that the educational benefits derived from
diversity qualified as a compelling state interest and proceeded
to grant educational institutions a significant degree of deference
with respect to the fashioning of diversity-based admissions
policies that consider race as a factor.3 ' Because the O'Connor
opinion for the majority in Grutter and the Rehnquist opinion for
the majority in Gratz will have a controlling effect on university
admissions policies, and because these opinions will have a
30.
Id. at 2368-69 & 2368 tbls.1-3 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
31.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 853 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd, 288
F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), affd, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
32.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 751-52 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), affd, 123 S.
Ct. 2325 (2003).
33.
Id. at 746-49.
34.
Id. at 773, 776-808 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
35.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2003).
36.
See, e.g., Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339-42 (discussing some of the arguments
presented in the numerous amicus briefs).
37.
Id. at 2330-31, 2347; Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2416, 2430-31.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337, 2339, 2345.
38.
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significant impact on equal protection doctrine, they are worthy
of close analysis. In working through these opinions, I will
consider the critiques of the dissenters at relevant points rather
than separately at the end.

III. GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER
A.

The Legal Significance of the Powell Opinion in Bakke

It was all but inevitable that the Michigan cases would shed
some light on the precedential significance of Bakke, especially
Justice Powell's opinion endorsing diversity as a compelling state
interest. Indeed, as Judge Wiener wrote in his concurrence in
Hopwood, eventually the Supreme Court would need "to go with,
over, around, or through Justice Powell's Bakke opinion" in order
to decide whether racial preferences in higher education were
constitutionally permissible.39 At the outset, the Court
summarized the Powell opinion in Bakke.4 ° It noted that Justice
Powell had both read the Equal Protection Clause as focusing on
the individual"' and, to ensure that individual rights would be
protected in light of a government classification on the basis of
race, applied a strict standard of review.42 The Grutter Court then
noted that Justice Powell had rejected three rationales for the
use of racial preferences tendered by the Regents in Bakke,
accepting only the fourth-achievement of a diverse student
body. 3 The Court then briefly summarized Justice Powell's
explanation of a constitutionally valid approach for achieving
such diversity, including that the university must consider all
facets of relevant diversity in a competitive admissions process
and not simply race.4 4
Next, the Court explicitly endorsed Justice Powell's diversity
approach.4 5 However, it remains somewhat unclear exactly what
weight the Powell opinion carries as legal authority. The Grutter
majority recognized that none of the opinions in Bakke

39. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 964 n.18 (5th Cir. 1996) (Wiener, J., specially
concurring).
40. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2336-37 (endorsing "Justice Powell's view that student
body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university
admissions").
41. Id. at 2336.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 2337.
45. Id.
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"commanded a majority of the Court."4 6 Wisely, however, it
refused to be drawn into the difficult task of attempting to
discern, under the analysis of Marks v. United States,4 ' exactly
what was the rationale of a majority of the Court. 48 The Court of
Appeals opinion in Grutter had demonstrated that this was
certainly an issue on which "reasonable minds can and do
differ."49 A lower court was required to determine to what extent
Bakke was a valid precedent that had to be followed; ° the
Supreme Court, however, could simply decide whether and to
what extent Justice Powell's reasoning was persuasive and adopt
it anew regardless of whether it was technically binding. That is
what the Court seemed to do as it conceded that the short
paragraph in section III.C of Justice Powell's opinion was the
only place in which he spoke for a majority of the Court.51
The Grutter Court purported to take the Powell opinion on
diversity quite seriously, noting that "[public and private
universities across the Nation" have placed heavy reliance on it
in developing their own policies.52 There is no question that this
is true. Still, it tells little about Bakke's status as legal precedent,
unless the Court means to say that widespread reliance on the
opinion of a single Justice over a lengthy period of time can
significantly enhance its status as legal authority. All the Court
really did was simply incorporate Justice Powell's opinion by
reference. The Powell opinion is far richer, more comprehensive,
and more nuanced than the opinion of the Court in Grutter." So
the question arises whether those aspects of the Powell opinion
that the Court did not discuss or refer to should be taken as
46.
Id. at 2335.
47.
430 U.S. 188 (1977).
48.
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337.
49.
Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 739-42 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(applying Marks and determining that Justice Powell's opinion was "Bakke's narrowest
rationale"), affd, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), with id. at 778-85 (Boggs, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the application of Marks to Bakke is inapt because Justice Powell's opinion
was on different (not narrower) grounds). Applying Marks leads to two possible outcomes,
and the Court has already recognized that Bakke does not contain a useful holding
regarding constitutionally permissible uses of race. Id. at 778-85 (Boggs, J., dissenting). I
have taken the position in the past that the Marks analysis cannot produce a coherent
majority rationale in Bakke. Bloom, supra note 17, at 28-34.
50.
See Grutter, 288 F.3d at 739 (explaining and rejecting the district court's view
that Bakke was not binding).
51.
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2336.
52.
Id.
53.
Compare Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.), with Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2336-47 (discussing Justice Powell's
Bakke opinion and, under its own reasoning, endorsing Justice Powell's position that
diversity is a compelling state interest capable of justifying the use of race as a factor in
university admissions).
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implicitly endorsed by a majority of the Court, or whether they
simply remain the observations of one Justice. In the future, it is
certainly possible that courts may be forced to wrestle with this
issue.
Justice Kennedy, dissenting, accepted Justice Powell's
opinion as the correct approach, presumably for its persuasive
force as opposed to its binding status, but argued that the
majority had failed to apply it properly. 4 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, dissenting, seemed to treat the Powell opinion as the
law of the land (although perhaps only for sake of argument), but
like Justice Kennedy, he argued that the majority misapplied it.55
Simply counting heads, it appears that seven members of the
Court were willing to accept a limited use of race to achieve
diversity in a university student body and to recognize diversity
in this setting as a compelling state interest. This, in itself, is
somewhat surprising.
B. The Standardof Review
No issue in Grutter more clearly divided the majority from
the dissenters than the question of the appropriate standard of
review. On its face, the Court was unanimous that, pursuant to
the Powell opinion in Bakke as well as the Court's opinions in
Crosan and Adarand, strict scrutiny must apply.5 6 In beginning
her analysis of the Law School's admissions process, Justice
O'Connor emphasized the need for strict scrutiny 7 but repeated
her cautionary observation from Adarand that "[sitrict scrutiny
is not 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."'58 She also noted that
"[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based governmental
action" 5 and that "En]ot every decision influenced by race is
equally objectionable and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a
framework for carefully examining the importance and the
sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2370 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
54.
majority failed to properly apply the strict scrutiny standard).
See id. at 2365-66 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting and citing Bakke
55.
numerous times but finding that the majority had not followed Bakke's lead). Chief
Justice Rehnquist did not join Justice Thomas's opinion, which argued that diversity was
not a compelling state interest. Id. at 2350-65 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
See id. at 2337-38 (stating that the Justices agree that "all racial classifications
56.
imposed by government must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Id. at 2337.
57.
Id. at 2338 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237
58.
(1995)).
Id.
59.
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decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular context."6 As
a practical matter, these qualifications signaled that the Court
was preparing to apply the strict standard of review in a manner
that would prove to be wholly unacceptable to the dissenting
Justices and difficult to square with the Powell opinion itselfalthough Justice Powell himself seemed to apply strict scrutiny
more leniently to a racial classification two years after Bakke in
Fullilove v. Klutznick.6 The strict standard of review, as often
described by the Court, requires that the state demonstrate a
compelling state interest and show that the classification in
question is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 62 If not
fatal in fact, the standard is certainly demanding and difficult to
satisfy.
1. Is Diversity a Compelling State Interest? The first
question that the majority needed to confront in Grutter was
whether the Law School had put forth a compelling state interest
to justify the explicit use of race in its admissions process.63
Presumably, before determining whether an interest is
compelling, the Court should define that interest clearly. The
majority opinion in Grutter suffers from an inability or
unwillingness to define the state's purported state interest with
precision." As such, it is difficult to assess whether the state
interest is compelling given that the state's interest is not always
clear.
a. What Is the State Interest and Why Is It Compelling? At
the outset of its application of strict scrutiny, the Court stated
that the only interest the Law School relied upon throughout the
litigation was "the educational benefits that flow from a diverse
student body."6" A paragraph later, the Court declared that the
Law School had a compelling state interest in attaining a diverse

60.
Id.
61.
448 U.S. 448, 507-16 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (approving Congress's
remedy for discrimination in the construction industry by allowing a set-aside of federal
money for minority contractors). Justices Stewart and Stevens made a persuasive case
that the program in Fullilove could not satisfy the strict standard as traditionally
understood. See id. at 528-30 (Stewart, J. dissenting); id. at 551-54 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
62. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986).
63. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2335 (stating that the reason ior granting certiorari
was to determine if diversity was a compelling state interest and that could justify the
narrowly tailored use of race in university admissions).
64.
Id. at 2338-41 (failing to clarify whether the compelling interest was a "diverse
student body" or the "educational benefits" that flow from such diversity).
65.
Id. at 2338 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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student body."6 The difference between these two statements led
Justice Thomas to conclude that, contrary to the second
statement, the interest alleged to be compelling was not "a
diverse student body" but rather the "educational benefits" that
67
presumably flow from such a diverse student body. According to
Justice Thomas, diversity in and of itself is a means, not an end,
thus raising the questions concerning what these compelling
educational benefits are, whether they in fact flow from diversity,
and whether they could be achieved in some other less
discriminatory manner.
In the very next sentence after proclaiming that diversity is
a compelling state interest, the majority declared that "[t]he Law
School's educational judgment that such diversity is essential to
6
its educational mission is one to which we defer." Was the Court
stating that diversity is a compelling state interest because the
Michigan Law School says it is? Surely not. If so, then the Court
has effectively dropped the standard of review from strict
scrutiny to rational basis review. Ultimately, the question of
whether an interest is compelling must be a question of
constitutional law, not educational need.69 Presumably, the Court
meant to say: "The Law School believes that a diverse student
body is educationally important and who are we, the Court, to
disagree with that assessment? However, it remains our
obligation, as the Court, to determine whether the use of race in
achieving such diversity is constitutionally compelling." That in
Id. at 2338-39.
66.
Id. at 2352-53 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
67.
Thomas also argued that, because a state need not maintain a law school at all-and
certainly not an elite law school-maintaining diversity in its law school, if it does in fact
choose to maintain one, can hardly be a compelling state interest because having the law
school itself is not a compelling interest. Id. at 2354-55 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). This argument may have some superficial appeal, but on
reflection it is not persuasive. A municipality need not appropriate funds for public works
projects either, but if it chooses to do so, providing a remedy for proven past
discrimination either by the government or by private contractors would presumably be a
compelling state interest. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492
(1989). This is an example of the principle in constitutional law that the greater does not
always subsume the lesser.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
68.
See id. at 2365-69 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
69.
(criticizing the deference the Court showed the Law School in defining the compelling
interest question); see also Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioningthe Legal Constitution:
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARv. L. REV. 4, 65-67 (2003) (observing that the Court
protected its dominion over constitutional law in its analysis of the 'narrowly tailored"
prong of the strict scrutiny test). But see Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political
Acts: Guardians at the Gates of our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 180-82
(2003) (supporting the deference shown to the university because it allows the school the
flexibility needed to judge the individual merits of applicants and to adapt to changing
times).
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turn leads back to the question of what diversity accomplishes.
After accepting the Law School's judgment, the Court asserted
that "[t]he Law School's assessment that diversity will, in fact,
yield educational benefits is substantiated by respondents and
their amici."7° If anything, deferring to the conclusions of amici
wholly untested by the adversarial process seems even more
troublesome than deferring to the conclusions of a party to the
litigation.
The Court stated, somewhat defensively, "Our scrutiny of
the interest asserted by the Law School is no less strict for taking
into account complex educational judgments in an area that lies
primarily within the expertise of the university."7' It then cited
and briefly discussed the line of academic freedom cases relied on
by Justice Powell in his Bakke opinion for the proposition that
the Court should defer to academic judgments, especially with
respect to the selection of students.72 In Bakke, Justice Powell
could not exactly contend that the First Amendment, in and of
itself, supplied the compelling state interest because the line of
academic freedom cases on which he relied was concerned with
protecting the individual against the state rather than, as in
Bakke, the state against the individual. 3 As such, the most that
Justice Powell or the Grutter majority could legitimately claim is
that the admissions decisions of a public university fall within
the general vicinity of First Amendment concern. 4 Justice
Thomas argues convincingly that neither Justice Powell nor the
Gruttermajority have explained how a few statements in dicta by
Justice Frankfurter, taken wholly out of context, are capable of
giving rise to an academic freedom principle that justifies near
complete judicial deference to educational judgments involving
the use of racial classifications. 5

70.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
71.
Id.
72.
Id.
73.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-14 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.) (reiterating that academic freedom has long been viewed as a "special concern
of the First Amendment"). To support his statements, Justice Powell cited to Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (holding that a professor's arrest for refusal to
answer questions from the attorney general about lectures was an invasion of his liberties
in the areas of academic freedom and political expression) and Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (protecting public school teachers from state action that
infringed on their academic freedom). Id. at 311-14 (opinion of Powell, J.).
74.
See id. at 312 (opinion of Powell, J.); Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339 (recognizing
academic freedom as emanating from the First Amendment).
75.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2357 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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Asserting that universities have a First Amendment-based
right of autonomy in selecting their student bodies was a tricky
move for Justice Powell and the Grutter Court to make. If
universities have this right, then arguably they should have the
right to choose whatever degree or mix of diversity, including
racial diversity, they believe appropriate. Thus, if universities
autonomy of
truly have such First Amendment-based
decisionmaking, they can easily determine that the only type of
diversity that really matters is racial diversity (which is in fact
probably the case for many universities). *However, neither
Justice Powell nor the Grutter Court was willing to follow this
logic to that conclusion. Rather, once racial diversity entered the
equation, universities were told that they could exercise their
academic freedom based autonomy not as they thought
appropriate, but only in the manner that Justice Powell found
appropriate, that is, through the "plus-in-the-file" Harvard-type
approach."6 Apparently, this thought is dictated by the fact that
race is constitutionally different than any other diversifying
factor.77 Still, the decisionmaking autonomy that Justice Powell,
and now the Grutter Court, is prepared to recognize in academic
institutions is a highly qualified autonomy to be sure.
Having briefly discussed the First Amendment, academic
freedom background of the institution's decisionmaking
autonomy, the majority then reemphasized, "Our conclusion that
the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse student
body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student
body is at the heart of the Law School's proper institutional
mission."" However, the majority had not identified any reason
for so believing aside from pure deference to the assertions of the
Law School itself and the various amici. It then quoted Justice
Powell's observation in Bakke that 'good faith' on the part of 7as
university is 'presumed' absent 'a showing to the contrary.''
Four paragraphs into the analytical section of the opinion, the
continuous drumbeat of deference, deference, deference rings out
loud and clear. It is fair to say that no other opinion purporting
to apply the strict standard of review has ever projected such a
tone.

76.
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-17 (opinion of Powell, J.) (forbidding racial quotas in
admissions, but allowing race to be used as a factor in these decisions).
77.
See, e.g., Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2359-60 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that the Constitution does not prohibit discrimination based on
"legacy" preferences although it does prohibit discrimination based on race).
78. Id. at 2339.
79. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S at 318-19 (opinion of Powell, J.)).
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At this point, the Court confronted the issue of "critical
mass," which was the most serious constitutional obstacle in the
path of the Law School.8 ° The primary argument against the Law
School's admissions policy was that its emphasis on admitting a
critical mass of minority students, particularly black students, is
functionally indistinguishable from a quota.8 In addressing the
issue of critical mass, the Court noted that the Law School was
not pursuing critical mass for purposes of racial proportionality,
which would be per se illegal, but rather for the purpose of
attaining "the educational benefits that diversity is designed to
produce."82 It is only at this point that the Court mentioned these
seemingly crucial educational benefits, noting that the district
court "emphasized [that] the Law School's admissions policy
promotes 'cross-racial understanding,' helps to break down racial
stereotypes, and 'enables [students] to better understand persons
of different races."'83 Actually, the district court did not
"emphasize" that the racial diversity yielded these positive
benefits. Rather, it simply observed that those were the benefits
that the Law School "asserted" and "argued" that diversity
produced and assumed that diversity did produce.8 4 Still, the
district court viewed the Law School's claims about the benefits
of racial diversity far more skeptically than the Supreme Court's
opinion would suggest. In addressing the question of the benefits
of diversity, the district court said that
a distinction should be drawn between viewpoint diversity
and racial diversity. While the educational benefits of the
former are clear, those of the latter are less so. The
defendants' witnesses emphasized repeatedly that it is a
diversity of viewpoints, experiences, interests, perspectives,
and backgrounds which creates an atmosphere most
conducive to learning. As Dean Lehman testified, it is
primarily a "diversity of views" that the law school seeks.
The
connection between race and viewpoint is tenuous,
85
at best.
In any event, the Court's quotation from the district court
does not fully capture the Law School's theory of critical mass.
80. Id.
81.
See id. at 2348 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2365 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting);
id. at 2371-72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
82.
Id. at 2339.
83.
Id. at 2339-40 (second alteration in original) (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert.
246a).
84.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 850 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd, 288 F.3d
732 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), affd, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
85.
Id. at 849.
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The Law School argued that having a critical mass of minority
students was crucial because it prevented minority students from
feeling isolated and feeling as though they must be the
spokespersons for their races, ensured that there would be a
sufficient number of minority students to interact with
nonminority students in small groups, and provided a sufficient
number of minority students to illustrate that there is a diversity
of viewpoints within minority communities. 6 Ironically, Chief
Justice Rehnquist captured the flavor of the Law School's
argument better in his dissent than the majority did in its
opinion. s7
The Court did not bother to describe the educational benefits
that flow from broad-based, plus-in-the-file diversity, as had
Justice Powell when discussing the Harvard plan in Bakke."s
Instead, it focused exclusively on the benefits to be derived from
race-based diversity, especially as promoted by the use of critical
mass.89 Perhaps the Court assumed that we all have read Bakke
and are familiar with Justice Powell's justifications for plus-inthe-file-type diversity, so why bother to go over all of that again.
Or maybe it simply concluded that this case was really about a
use of race that is arguably more pronounced and vigorous than
anything contemplated by Justice Powell, so why not go straight
to the heart of the matter. Whatever the reason, the Court's
failure to reiterate why broad-based diversity is important leaves
the impression that it viewed it as nothing more than a fig leaf to
cover an aggressive use of racial preferences. As far as the reader
can tell from the Court's opinion, the educational benefits that
result in a compelling state interest flow all but exclusively from
racial as opposed to viewpoint-oriented diversity. This seems to
be in tension, if not in outright conflict, with Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke.9" It seems as though the Court has implicitly
86.
Brief for Respondents at 2-3, Grutter (No. 02-241) [hereinafter Grutter
Respondents' Brief].
87.
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2366 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
88.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-19 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
89.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339-41 (listing cross-racial understanding, more
enlightening and interesting class discussion, better preparation for a diverse workforce
and society, a strong military, and the creation of respected national leaders as benefits
derived from racially diverse institutions).
90.
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (opinion of Powell, J.) (finding that the diversity that
gives rise to a compelling state interest cannot be merely racial or ethnic diversity).
Justice Powell quoted William Bowen, president of Princeton University, who described
the broad scope of educational benefits that flow from a student body that is diverse.
[A] great deal of learning occurs informally. It occurs through interactions
among students of both sexes; of different races, religions, and backgrounds; who
come from cities and rural areas, from various states and countries; who have a
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altered the nature of the compelling. state interest involved.
Apparently, it has taken the position that the Law School has a
compelling state interest in seeking the educational benefits of a
diverse student body that contains a critical mass of minority
students.
To "bolster" the Law School's claim regarding the
significance of racial diversity, the majority referred to "expert
studies and reports entered into evidence at trial."9 The district
court only referred to these studies in passing." If these reports
and studies did support the claim that diversity-especially
racial diversity-provided significant educational benefits, it
would have been useful for the Court to summarize the reports
and studies in detail so that the reader would have had some
idea why the Court was convinced of the educational value of
critical mass racial diversity. The Court also cited one amicus
brief and three secondary sources for proof of the benefits of
racial diversity.93 Although this material may well be informative
and useful, it was apparently not record evidence that had been
tested by the adversary process.9 4 It certainly would have been
helpful, however, for the Court to describe some of the findings of
this research, as they presumably provided the basis for the
recognition of the educational benefits of racial diversity as a
compelling state interest.
To demonstrate that "[t]hese benefits are not theoretical but
real,"'" the Court cited the briefs filed by major American
businesses,9 6 as well as an apparently highly influential brief
wide variety of interests, talents, and perspectives; and who are able, directly or
indirectly, to learn from their differences and to stimulate one another to
reexamine even their most deeply held assumptions about themselves and their
world.
Id. at 312 n.48 (opinion of Powell, J.) (alteration in original).
91.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 849-50 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd,
92.
288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), affd, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
93.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340 (citing Brief of the American Educational Research
Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Grutter (No. 02-241);
WILLIAM BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF
CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998); COMPELLING
INTEREST: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON RACIAL DYNAMICS IN COLLEGES AND

UNIVERSITIES (Mitchell Chang et al. eds., 2003); DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON
THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (Gary Orfield & Michale Kurlaender eds., 2001)).
See Grutter, 288 F.3d at 767 (mentioning the Bowen-Bok book in a concurring
94.
opinion only); Grutter, 137 F. Supp. at 821 (failing to mention any of the sources on which
the Supreme Court relied).
Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2340.
95.
96. Id. (citing Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in Support of
Respondents at 5, Grutter (No. 02-241), Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411 (2003) (No. 02516) [hereinafter 3M Brief]; Brief of General Motors Corporation as Amicus Curiae in
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filed by a group of retired high-ranking military leaders.9 7 Simply
as a matter of advocacy, the Court should have noted that the
brief that it referred to as the "3M brief' was in fact filed on
behalf of many of the most prominent companies in the country,
including American Express, Coca-Cola, General Electric,
Microsoft, and sixty-one others, and that the military leaders
included Generals Wesley K. Clark, H. Norman Schwarzkopf,
and John M.D. Shalikashvili and Admiral William J. Crowe. 98
These were impressive groups of companies and retired officers.
The prestige of these amici may well have influenced the Court
and presumably would have impressed the reader of the opinion
as well if the Court had elaborated.
The 3M Brief's focus on the challenges of a global
marketplace and multicultural competence seemed to express an
interest in a far broader and internationally oriented form of
diversity than that which Michigan was defending.99 The gist of
the Military Officers' Brief, at least the portion that the Court
quoted, was essentially that the military needs a great many
capable minority students to participate in ROTC, and that if
colleges may not employ racial preferences in admissions, there
simply will not be a large enough pool of minority officer
candidates. 1°
'
Although the retired military officers were
concerned with the educational benefits to be gained from diverse
perspectives in the classroom, they seemed even more concerned
that the conveyor belt of qualified minority officer candidates
keeps moving.10 1 This may well be a compelling interest, but it is
hot exactly the interest that Michigan purported to be
attempting to achieve, nor was it the interest that Justice Powell
blessed in Bakke. °2
The Court also quoted the Military Officers' Brief for the
proposition that "the military 'must be selective in admissions for
training and education for the officer corps, and it must train and
educate a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps in a

Support of Respondents at 3-4, Grutter(No. 02-241), Gratz (No. 02-516)).
97.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340 (citing Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W.
Becton, Jr., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 27, Grutter (No. 02-241),
Gratz (No. 02-516) [hereinafter Military Officers' Brief]).
98.
3M Brief, supra note 96; Military Officers' Brief, supranote 97, at 2-4.
99.
See 3M Brief, supra note 96, at 5-7 (outlining the need for a diverse workforce
to continue and expand their current global reach).
100.
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340.
101.
See Military Officers' Brief, supra note 97, at 18-30.
102.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338-39; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 311-14 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (blessing the use of race to create a diverse
student body, thereby allowing educational benefits to follow).
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racially diverse setting."" 3 It also quoted this brief for the
proposition that "[i]t requires only a small step from this analysis
to conclude that our country's other most selective institutions
must remain both diverse and selective.' 0 4
Perhaps recognizing the outcome-based nature of the retired
military officers' argument, the Court shifted its focus from the
internal educational benefits of diversity to the significance of
education in "sustaining our political and cultural heritage" and
its "fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of society."'' This
led the majority to conclude that it is crucial that institutions of
higher learning are "'open and available to all segments of
American society, including people of all races and ethnicities."" 6
The Court seemed to be shifting the focus away from the
compelling interest in the educational benefits of diversity in the
classroom, racial or otherwise, and toward a need for or a right of
access to higher education by members of all racial and ethnic
groups. This reaches dangerously close to the interest in racial
balancing that, as the Court noted, was declared unconstitutional
per se by Justice Powell in Bakke. "7
The Court then explained that a high percentage of
governors and U.S. Senators and Representatives have law
degrees, and that a small number of schools have produced a
large percentage of Senators and federal judges.' 8 This led the
Court to conclude that if the country is to "cultivate a set of
leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is
necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented
and qualified individuals of every race."'0 9 Here the Court
introduced two more interests that may be served by racially
preferential admissions policies and that might very well be
compelling in their own rights-the need to ensure that leaders
from every racial group are produced and the need to assure the
public that paths to leadership are open to all. However
significant these interests may be, they are not the same as the
classroom benefits generally claimed for diversity of perspective.
Instead, the Court seemed to be focusing more on the output of
the educational process rather than on the process itself. In a
103.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340 (quoting Military Officers' Brief, supra note 97, at
29).
104.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
105.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
106.
Id. at 2340 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 13, Grutter (No. 02-241) [hereinafter Brief for the United States]).
Id. at 2336.
107.
108.
Id. at 2341.
109.
Id.
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nutshell, the Court seemed to be saying that racial preferences in
admission are a compelling interest because they help assure the
continued production of minority leaders as well as the
perception that minorities have a fair chance to receive
leadership training. This is essentially the retired military
officers' argument transplanted into a civilian context, the "small
step" that the Military Officers' Brief urged the Court to take.1 '
Once again, it is not the traditional diversity argument and is in
fact more closely related to the argument that both Justice
Powell and the Grutter majority have elsewhere purported to
reject."'
The majority then. observed that the Law School was not
proceeding on the assumption that there is a "characteristic
minority viewpoint,""2 but rather that there is not, and that only
a critical mass of minority students can dispel this belief." 3 This
position seems to be designed to diffuse any contention that the
Law School is simply perpetuating racial stereotypes, a practice
that would presumably be unconstitutional as argued by Justice
O'Connor at length in her dissent in Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v.
FCC." 4 The Court concluded the section of its opinion discussing
compelling state interests not by stating that all of the evidence
had convinced the Court that there was such an interest, but
rather by stating that the Law School had so determined "based
on its experience and expertise.""' 5 As far as the Court seemed to
be concerned, that unquestionably self-serving conclusion
sufficed as a matter of constitutional law, therefore needing little
if any independent judicial review.
b. Where Do Compelling Interests Come From? In Grutter,
the Court recognized a new compelling state interest, at least if
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was not controlling precedent
(and perhaps even if it was). The Court described the interest as
either diversity in the student body or,"' more frequently, as the

110.
Id. at 2340 (internal quotation marks omitted); Military Officers' Brief, supra
note 97, at 29.
111.
See id. at 2336; see also Post, supra note 69, at 60-61 (explaining how the
Grutter opinion appears to expand the compelling interest of diversity beyond higher
education to include protection of our "political and cultural heritage" and to provide a
training ground for tomorrow's leaders (internal quotation marks omitted)).
112.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341 (internal quotation marks omitted).
113.
See id.
114.
497 U.S. 547, 614-15, 618-20 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
115.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
116.
See id. at 2338.
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educational benefits derived from such diversity." 7 Those benefits
seem to go far beyond the benefits of classroom interchange and
out-of-class learning emphasized by Justice Powell and the
Harvard plan. Unlike the Powell opinion, Grutter focused almost
exclusively on the benefits derived from racial diversity-more
specifically, critical mass racial diversity as opposed to broadbased diversity-of perspective and experience." 8 Indeed, the
Grutter Court seemed highly concerned with the larger societal
benefits of racial diversity, such as keeping American businesses
competitive, producing a stream of minority students capable of
military leadership, and assuring society that persons from all
races have access to the paths to civilian leadership." 9 The Court
cited these societal benefits but made no effort to describe their
significance to its conclusion.'2 ° Thus, there is no way to tell
whether they were crucial elements in the decision that diversity
is compelling or whether they were simply useful byproducts.
The Court's emphasis on societal benefits would certainly suggest
the former.
In the years leading up to Grutter, and as racial preferences
in higher education came under increased attack, proponents of
the diversity justification believed that the Court would demand
convincing empirical proof that racial diversity was indeed highly
beneficial to the educational process.'' The Law School
attempted to do just that in Grutter 2 and certainly was met with
some skepticism by the district court'23 as well as by Judge
Boggs's dissent in the Sixth Circuit.'24 The Supreme Court made
no effort to examine evidence on the issue of whether broadbased experiential diversity, or racial diversity in particular,
significantly enhance classroom interchange or the educational
process in general. Rather, the Court seemed to say that the Law
117.
See id. at 2341.
See id. at 2339-41.
118.
119.
See id. at 2340-41.
See id. at 2339-41.
120.
121.
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION, RACE, AND AMERICAN VALUES 113, 170-72 (1996) (citing the Supreme Court's
statement in Adarand that "[more than good motives should be required when
government seeks to allocate its resources by way of an explicit racial classification
system" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
122.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332-34 (summarizing the Law School's case); see also
Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 825-43 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (considering this
evidence in great detail), rev'd, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), affd, 123 S. Ct.
2325 (2003).
See Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 849-50 (expressing doubt that the Law School's
123.
evidence supported a finding of a compelling state interest).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 803-06 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Boggs,
124.
J., dissenting) (criticizing the Law School's evidence), affd, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
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School believes that diversity is valuable, and that is good
enough.' 5
Presumably, a "compelling state interest," taken literally, is
a state interest of the highest order. 126 Prior to Grutter, national
128
security 127 and the provision of a remedy for past discrimination
were the only interests recognized as compelling under the Equal
Protection Clause in the context of racial discrimination-at least
by a majority of the Court. These seem like easy cases. Protecting
the security of the nation is essential to the very survival of the
Constitution and the American people. It is compelling by nature.
Providing a remedy for past discrimination is also of great
constitutional importance. If a primary objective of the Equal
Protection Clause is to prohibit racial discrimination, then
providing a remedy for past discrimination must be of equal
constitutional significance. Presumably, few other state interests
are powerful enough to prevail over the prohibition against racial
discrimination, given its constitutional primacy. In his dissent,
Justice Thomas pointed out that several other interests,
including protecting the best interests of a child, providing a
remedy for societal discrimination, and providing role models for
minority students, have all been rejected as compelling interests
where racial classifications are involved.'29 With respect to the
role model theory rejected in Wygant, Justice Thomas asked why
the school district in that case was undeserving of the same type
of deference to its educational judgment that the Law School
received in Grutter."° The question was a good one, and the
majority failed to address it, much less provide an answer.
It is likely that in the course of defending legislation or
regulations, states will be willing to argue that whatever interest
they may happen to be trying to promote is compelling, especially
if that is the only way to prevail in litigation. If a sincere belief by
the state will suffice to make it compelling, then compelling
interests will be the rule rather than the rare exception.
Certainly the Court does not intend for that to happen. There is
no reason to believe that this one decision was designed to
overturn fifty years of equal protection precedent. Consequently,
there needs to be some objective legal means by which the Court
can distinguish true compelling interests from pretenders.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
part).
130.

See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339-40.
Id. at 2351-52 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-19 (1944).
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989).
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2351-52 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
Id. at 2351 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Perhaps there is no reliable gauge of constitutional importance,
but it would not be too much to expect the Court to attempt to
make some assessment of the significance of the state interest
before declaring it compelling. Otherwise, there would seem to be
little separating the compelling state interest of strict scrutiny
from the important state interest of intermediate scrutiny and
the legitimate state interest of rational basis review.
Apparently, the Court's position is that educational
institutions are constitutionally entitled to this extreme degree of
deference because of the First Amendment-related interest in
academic freedom.'
No other government institution is
constitutionally worthy of such trust. As noted above,'32 and as
developed by Justice Thomas in dissent,13 3 the academic freedom
argument is simply too contrived to bear this weight. Certainly
other institutions of government could assert that they too are
entitled to a constitutionally based autonomy of decisionmaking.
For instance, Congress could claim that it has a First
Amendment-based compelling interest in regulating all facets of
electoral speech or broadcast communications. States could claim
a constitutionally based compelling interest in regulating every
aspect of state elections. If these claims were recognized, and if
the Court granted these governmental branches the degree of
deference shown in Grutter, it would cut a wide and deep swath
through well-established free speech and equal protection
jurisprudence. But that is highly unlikely to happen. Rather, the
Court will probably continue to treat the deference shown to
educational institutions as constitutionally unique, even if its
position is difficult to defend logically.
Based on the evidence in the record developed at trial,
reasonable people could disagree whether Michigan had
established that its interest in racial diversity was
constitutionally compelling. But if the Court was inclined to so
conclude, as obviously it was, it did have a record from which it
could have built an argument-one that would have allowed it to
reach an independent judgment rather than simply deferring to
the Law School's expertise."' The failure to do so will almost
certainly come back to haunt the Court in the future as it
131.
See id. at 2339 (recognizing that because of both public education's importance
and the freedoms of speech and thought related to the university setting, universities
function in a "special niche in our constitutional tradition").
132.
Refer to notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text.
133.
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2357 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (criticizing the Court's creation of an academic freedom exception).
134.
See id. at 2339-41 (describing the evidence of the benefits of a diverse student
body on which the Court could have made an independent judgment).
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struggles to explain why similar deference is not warranted in
other contexts.
2. Narrow Tailoring.
a. The Quest for Critical Mass. The Court began its
discussion of narrow tailoring by denying Justice Kennedy's
claim that it had abandoned the narrow tailoring element of
strict scrutiny while noting that it is proper to take relevant
differences in application into account."' Then, quoting from the
Powell opinion in Bakke, the Court acknowledged that an
admissions program may not use a quota that insulates minority
students from competition, but that it may use race as a plus-inthe-file, considering "'all pertinent elements of diversity."'136 The
majority concluded that the Michigan process followed the model
of the Harvard plan and was not a quota or set-aside.137 The
record indicated that Michigan purported to consider a wide
range of diversifying factors, as Justice Powell had required.'3 8
The Court noted that the Law School did not use the type of
mechanical criteria struck down in the companion Gratz case...
and did admit nonminority candidates who had diversifying
characteristics, even though they had academic indicators lower
than rejected minority applicants. 4 '
The question was whether Michigan's quest for a critical
mass of underrepresented minority students, along with its close
attention to the "daily reports" detailing the up-to-date, precise
number of minorities admitted and accepting, showed that in fact
Michigan was striving to fill a quota of minority students.' The
Court noted that Justice Powell in Bakke had recognized that
under the Harvard plan, a "goal" for minority admissions was
permissible and that an acceptable diversity plan did not require
It then
that every factor be accorded the same weight.'
concluded that in light of the testimony of the Michigan
admissions officers, there was no evidence that the Law School
had ventured beyond what was permissible under the Powell

135.
Id. at 2341-42.
136.
Id. at 2342 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
137.
Id.
138.
Id. at 2344.
139.
Id. at 2343.
140.
Id. at 2344.
141.
Id. at 2343.
142.
Id. at 2342 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317-18,
323 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
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approach in Bakke.' In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist
pointed out that the critical mass of each of the three
underrepresented minority groups varied significantly and
seemed generally to approximate the percentages of each group
in the applicant pool.' If the point of critical mass was to admit
a sufficient number of underrepresented minorities to encourage
uninhibited expression, it is unclear why the critical mass for
African-American students was so much larger than that for
Hispanic or Native American students, or why as few as three
Native American students constituted a critical mass.'45 The
majority neither acknowledged nor attempted to respond to this
argument, even though it seems to go straight to the heart of the
Law School's narrow tailoring defense.
In responding to the dissenting opinions of Justice Kennedy
and Chief Justice Rehnquist, the majority pointed out that, at least
during certain time periods, the percentage of minorities who chose
to attend the Law School had varied from year to year. "6 This seems
to ignore Chief Justice Rehnquist's demonstration that the
percentage of minorities in each of the three preferred groups
admitted each year carefully tracked the percentage of students
from each of the three groups applying each year. 1'4 Justice
Kennedy made a similar showing in his dissent.' 4 As Chief Justice
Rehnquist pointed out, the admissions statistics are far more
relevant than the enrollment statistics because the school has
complete control over who is admitted and far less control over who
actually accepts the offers and attends.'49 In the absence of an
explanation from the Law School, Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the statistics demonstrated that the Law School had
in fact engaged in a longstanding practice of engaging in prohibited
racial balancing, that is, creating a class each year in which the
percentage of underrepresented minorities in each of the preferred
racial groups closely approximated the percentage of such
minorities in the applicant pool." Perhaps there is another
explanation for this statistical consistency; however, it is certainly
striking enough to raise serious questions about the Law School's
good faith and demand some explanation. The Court's failure to
seek such an explanation, and to even accurately acknowledge Chief
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 2343-45.
Id. at 2366-68 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2366-67 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2343.
Id. at 2367-69 & 2368 tbls.1-3 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at 2371-72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2369 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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Justice Rehnquist's argument, suggests both that the majority was
not applying strict scrutiny as it has been traditionally understood
and that the Court had no adequate answer to Chief Justice
Rehnquist's argument.
Certainly one response to Chief Justice Rehnquist's
argument is that it is not at all obvious why the Michigan Law
School would want to engage in precise racial balancing,
especially when it had every reason to know that to do so would
clearly be illegal. It seems more likely, given the nearly universal
academic desire for racial diversity, that the Law School wanted
to maximize racial diversity to the extent that it could without
taking students who were academically risky, and without taking
so many lower-scoring minority students that its median LSAT
score would decline to an unacceptable level. Quite possibly, the
reason why the percentage of admitted minority students closely
tracked the percentage of minority students in the applicant pool
is because the percentage of qualified minority students in the
pool tracked the overall percentage as well. If so, Michigan was
not attempting to engage in prohibited racial balancing but was
simply playing the hand it was dealt. It is unclear from the
record whether this hypothesis explains the relationship between
the percentage of minorities admitted and the percentage of
minorities in the pool, but it would seem to be as plausible as the
conclusion drawn by Chief Justice Rehnquist. By suggesting such
an alternative explanation, the Court could have shown that
there was a possibility that Chief Justice Rehnquist's conclusions
were flawed and, more importantly, that it took the narrow
tailoring requirement seriously. Instead, by failing to address the
issue, it left the impression that under its version of strict
scrutiny, potentially troublesome evidence can simply be ignored.
b. Race Neutral Alternatives. As the Grutter Court
acknowledged, the narrow tailoring element of strict scrutiny
contains a requirement that the state consider less
discriminatory means.' 5' This issue arose in oral argument with
Justice Scalia, in particular, pressing the Law School on why
lowering admissions standards was not a less discriminatory
alternative given that the Law School's high standards, driven by
its desire to remain an "elite" law school, had the foreseeable
of
percentage
a disproportionate
of excluding
effect
underrepresented minority applicants." 2 By failing to lower its
Id. at 2344-45.
151.
United States Supreme Court Transcript at 30-31, Grutter (No. 02-241) (Oral
152.
Argument of Maureen E. Mahoney for Respondents Lee Bollinger et al.) [hereinafter
Grutter Transcript]. Justice Scalia asked Ms. Mahoney, "Now, if Michigan really cares
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standards, the Law School was arguably valuing its elite status
more than diversity and essentially attempting to shift the cost of
its diversity goals from itself to the shoulders of rejected
nonminority applicants.
The majority summarily rejected this argument, stating that
the less discriminatory means requirement does not "require a
university to choose between maintaining a reputation for
excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide educational
opportunities to members of all racial groups," citing a statement
from a prior case that such alternatives must serve the interest
of the state "about as well." 5 ' However, as Justice Thomas
pointed out in dissent, this fails to explain why Michigan's elite
status is treated as part of the landscape immune from
alteration, especially given that Michigan clearly made a
deliberate choice in designing its admissions program to preserve
its elite admissions policy-knowing full well that this would
make it harder, if not impossible, to achieve a racially diverse
student body without employing significant racial preferences.'
The obvious inference is that, for a Court made up of nine
Justices, not to mention the law clerks who are all graduates of
elite, selective law schools, requiring a law school to sacrifice any
of its hard-earned status is all but unthinkable. To an outsider
this may have the smell of a tightly knit guild protecting its
privilege.
Justice Thomas asked in dissent why the Law School's
reputation would in fact decline if it used another method of
selection if the educational benefits from diversity really are as
great as it contends.'5 5 Why would it not be recognized as an
excellent law school providing important educational benefits?
The answer, as Justice Thomas obviously knows, is that law
schools are in fact evaluated and ranked to a very large extent by
the objective academic indicators of their student bodies and that
any decline in median LSAT scores or GPAs would be a fate that
few, if any, law school deans would care to confront. Had the
dissenters prevailed and law schools been forced to choose
between test score driven elitism and diversity, the world of legal
enough about that racial imbalance, why doesn't it do as many other State law schools do,
lower the standards, not have a flagship elite law school, it solves the problem." Id. at 31.
153.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2344-45 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509-10 (1989)).
154.
Id. at 2350, 2353 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Thomas also pointed out that the Court certainly showed no deference to the Virginia
Military Institute's (VMI) claim that admitting women would radically alter the nature of
the institution and the type of education it provided. Id. at 2358-59 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
155.
Id. at 2353 n.4 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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education might have been better off-at least if law schools
faced with such a decision chose diversity. This is not to suggest
that qualifications do not matter, but rather that law schools
have been forced to use overly narrow and mechanical methods of
measuring qualifications thanks to the current rankings system.
The sad reality, however-as Justices Scalia and Thomas no
56
doubt knew and as Michigan itself admitted' -is that the elite

law schools, if forced to choose, would reflexively choose to
maintain their test score driven reputations. Racial diversity
would fall by the wayside and the LSAT would continue to reign
supreme.
By concluding that a school need not sacrifice any
admissions-based prestige in order to satisfy the less
discriminatory means test, the Court has in effect amended its
definition of the compelling state interest, as Justice Thomas
recognized.'57 As a practical matter, the Court has held that a law
school has a compelling state interest in obtaining the
educational benefits that flow from diversity without having to
sacrifice selective admissions-based prestige.'58 On a broader
doctrinal level, this illustrates that one way to avoid having to
adopt a less discriminatory alternative is to define the compelling
interest in a manner that eliminates the less discriminatory
alternative as an option.
Ironically, the Military Officers' Brief that the majority
quoted favorably in parts of its opinion presented a very strong
argument in favor of not sacrificing quality for diversity. The
brief argued that applicants simply are not fungible and that
while the service academies need racial diversity, they also
desperately need the best applicants they can find in terms of
intellect, physical ability, and leadership potential if they are to
fulfill their mission of preparing top quality officers.155 The need
GrutterRespondents' Brief, supra note 86, at 13-14.
156.
No honestly colorblind alternative could produce educationally meaningful racial
diversity at present without substantially abandoning reliance on traditional
academic criteria, and hence abandoning academic excellence as well. The Law
School, having struggled for more than a century to build a great institution
dedicated to excellence in the advancement of human knowledge, will not
willingly do that.
Id.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2353 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
157.
part). As Justice Thomas put it, "The proffered interest that the majority vindicates
today, then, is not simply 'diversity.' Instead the Court upholds the use of racial
discrimination as a tool to advance the Law School's interest in offering a marginally
superior education while maintaining an elite institution." Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 2356 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158.
Military Officers' Brief, supra note 97, at 29.
159.
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for quality control is arguably stronger-indeed much strongerin the context of officer training, given the mental and physical
demands placed on officers and the obvious need for leadership
ability. Nonetheless, the need for quality control does transfer to
the elite law school context. 6 ° In one part of the opinion, the
majority quoted the Military Officers' Brief for the proposition
that "'[i]t requires only a small step from this analysis to
conclude that our country's other most selective institutions must
remain both diverse and selective."""' The Court took that step
but failed to explain or defend it clearly. Had the majority
returned to this argument in the portion of the opinion
discussing race neutral means and emphasized the importance of
academic selectivity to the creation of leaders in all groups of
society, the Court would have made great advances in explaining
why the Law School is really pursuing a very significant social
interest and not simply protecting its own elitist reputation. The
Military Officers' Brief seems to have seriously influenced the
result in Grutter. It is unfortunate that it did not have a greater
influence over the drafting of the opinion as well.
The amicus brief of the United States cited similar plans put
into effect in Texas, Florida, and California under which a
certain percentage-for example, the top ten percent of the
graduating class-of each high school in the state would be
admitted to the state's flagship public university.'62 This
approach tends to produce racial diversity without explicitly
relying on race, given the racially segregated nature of housing
and thus of public high schools.'63 The Court summarily
dismissed this alternative as unworkable at the graduate and
professional levels, and it rightly did so, for undergraduate
institutions for the most part are not nearly as racially
segregated as high schools; consequently, a percentage plan for
higher education probably would not yield significant racial
diversity.6

160.
But see Bryan W. Leach, Note, Race as Mission Critical:The OccupationalNeed
Rationale in Military Affirmative Action and Beyond, 113 YALE L.J. 1093, 1128-33 (2004),
for the argument that the need for racial diversity, while compelling in the military
context, does not easily translate to law and business.
161.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340 (alteration original) (quoting Military Officers' Brief,
supra note 97, at 29).
162.
Brief for the United States, supra note 106, at 14-18.
163.
See id. at 13-17 (arguing that diversity has been achieved in Texas, Florida, and
California under race-neutral programs offering admission to the top ranking percentages
of high school students).
164.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2345 (observing that the United States failed to explain
how such a plan could work at the graduate level and that such a plan would preclude
individualized assessments of applicants necessary for assembling a student body that is
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As with the issues of whether there was a compelling state
interest and whether the admissions policy was narrowly
tailored, the Court's conclusion that there were no race neutral
alternatives was based largely on its uncritical acceptance of the
assertions of the Law School.' 65 The Court was probably correct in
concluding that none of the race neutral alternatives were
workable and that perhaps the Law School had a compelling
interest in maintaining diversity and high academic standards,
but it certainly could have done a better job of explaining why.
c. Burden and Termination. Quoting again from Justice
Powell in Bakke, the Court acknowledged that racial preferences
create a serious problem of fairness in that they inevitably
burden nonminority applicants.'66 It maintained that narrow
tailoring prohibits unduly burdening others on account of race.'67
This position is, of course, subject to the criticism raised by
Justice Kennedy in his dissent that the majority did not apply
the narrow tailoring requirement with sufficient rigor to guard
against unfairness and burden. 66 The majority concluded that a
diversity program that considers a wide range of diversifying
factors not only refrains from burdening nonminority students,
but often positively benefits them by resulting in the admission
of nonminorities who would not have been admitted on the basis
of objective academic indicators alone.'66 The short answer to that
assertion, however, is that the Equal Protection Clause does not
concern the use of nonracial, soft variables. 7 ' The university
could have continued to extend such benefits to all students
whether or not it employed racial preferences. Moreover, the
Court implicitly seemed to recognize that, if at some point the
plus for racial diversity is overwhelmingly greater than the plus
for any other diversifying factor, then one cannot reasonably
maintain that the system does not unduly burden nonminorities.
Likewise, if the number of diversifying factors other than race is
quite limited, the burden might well be undue. This is not to
suggest that all diversifying factors must be equal. The Court's
opinion and Law School's policy are predicated on the
more than just racially diverse).
See id. at 2345-46.
165.
166.
Id. at 2345.
Id.
167.
168.
Id. at 2370 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2339-41, 2346 (describing the benefits of diversity in education and
169.
later concluding that the "race-conscious admissions program does not unduly harm
nonminority applicants").
See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880) (identifying the purpose
170.
of the Fourteenth Amendment as eliminating racial discrimination).
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assumption that they need not be. "1' But if the nonracial factors
are a mere facade intended to provide cover for racial preferences
and little else, then presumably such programs must fail the
fairness criterion.
In Croson, Justice O'Connor indicated that racial
preferences should be temporary measures and that to be
constitutional, they must have some logical end point.' 2 She
raised this concern again in oral argument in the Michigan cases
because the diversity justification does not seem to have such a
stopping point.17 3 In response to Justice O'Connor's concern, Ms.
Mahoney, counsel for the Law School, noted that the need for
racial preferences could terminate either when race no longer has
the social significance in American society that it has today or
when the grade and score gap between minorities and
nonminorities is significantly narrowed or erased.' 4 Given that it
is highly unlikely that either of these conditions will be met in
the remotely foreseeable future, there was some question as to
whether Justice O'Connor could accept diversity as a compelling
state interest. In deciding to do so, she clearly concluded that
some termination point must be identified. The Court observed
that the Law School had declared "that it would 'like nothing
better than to find a race neutral admissions formula' and will
terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as
practicable."' Once again, the Court showed total deference to
the Law School when explaining, "We take the Law School at its
word." '76 The Court then indicated that schools should impose
sunset provisions on racial preference programs, conduct periodic
reviews of their effectiveness, and search for race neutral
alternatives,' though it did not specifically impose any of these
limitations on the Michigan Law School. 7 ' As Justice Kennedy
171.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2342 ("[A]n admissions program must be 'flexible enough
to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of
each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not
necessarily according them the same weight.'" (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
172.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989) (stating that a
finding of some discrimination is required "to assure all citizens that the deviation from
the norm ... is a temporary matter").
173.
Grutter Transcript, supra note 152, at 41 (questioning Maureen Mahoney about
a termination point for giving groups preferences).
174.
Id. at 41-42 (answering Justice O'Connor's question).
175.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346 (quoting Grutter Respondents' Brief, supra note 86,
at 34).
176.
Id.
177.
Id.
178.
See id. (encouraging other schools to adopt the aforementioned measures, but
saying nothing about the Michigan Law School's adoption, or lack thereof, of such
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noted in dissent, however, the Michigan Law School and other
law schools seem to have little incentive to abandon their racial
preference programs in light of the almost conclusive deference
accorded to them by the Court.'79
The Court concluded by noting that Bakke was decided
twenty-five years ago, that the record indicates that minority
grades and test scores have increased since then, and that "[w]e
expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will
no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today."'8 0
Justice Thomas interpreted this statement as a commitment to
definitively end the use of racial preferences in twenty-five
years.'' That seems to be an overly optimistic reading of the
sentence. The Court did not say that racial preference programs
must end in twenty-five years, but rather that it "expects" that
they will no longer be needed.1 2 Justice Ginsburg seems closer to
the mark in her concurrence when she opined that the Court's
8 3 Although the
statement is more of a hope than a forecast."
evidence is disputed, there is no reason to believe that the test
score gap will have vanished or will even have significantly
narrowed in twenty-five years. 4 If it has not, then presumably
schools will be able to say, contrary to the Court's hope, that the
need for racial preferences still exists and that they must
continue. If the Court at that time exhibits the same degree of
deference to educational institutions as the Grutter Court did,
then continue they will. It seems likely that Chief Justice
Rehnquist is probably correct in his conclusion that the Court,
"[i]n truth,... permit[s] the Law School's use of racial
preferences on a seemingly permanent basis."'85
Like the Court's consideration of compelling state interests,
its review of narrow tailoring also seemed to be a watered down
version of strict scrutiny. The Court's analysis of the means-ends
relationship did not show the customary rigor associated with
strict scrutiny, and its treatment of less discriminatory means
seemed designed to minimize the role of that requirement.8 6 The
heart of Justice Kennedy's dissent was devoted to the argument
measures).
179.
Id. at 2373 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 2346-47.
181.
See id. at 2350-51 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182.
Id. at 2347.
183.
Id. at 2348 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
184.
Id. at 2364 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185.
Id. at 2370 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
186.
See id. at 2341-47 (requiring only "good faith consideration" of race-neutral
alternatives).
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that the majority accepted half of Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke-that race may be used as one factor in a competitive
individualized admissions process-but not the other-that an
institution using race as a factor must erect safeguards at every
stage of the admissions process and that the Court must
rigorously review such a school's policies and procedures to
ensure that they are not abusing or compromising the
individualized use of race." 7 The two halves of Powell's opinion
constitute the Powell compromise: Race may be used somewhat,
but only with the protection of rigorous judicial review.' 8 Justice
Kennedy demonstrated that the majority abandoned the
compromise by substituting extreme deference for strict scrutiny.
As such, Justice Kennedy's opinion is the true heir to the Powell
Bakke approach, while the majority opinion is little more than a
pale shadow of it.
Justice Thomas speculated that the Court might have been
differentiating between what it perceived to be benign rather
than invidious discrimination.'8 9 This seems unlikely because
such a distinction would reject the principle of consistency
recently articulated in Adarand.' ° Moreover, the distinction
would result in different outcomes in both Croson and Adarand,
for both programs were presumably adopted for benign rather
than invidious reasons.' It seems highly unlikely that Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Grutter majority, had any intention of
undermining Croson and Adarand, considering that she wrote
the majority opinions in both of those cases. Rather, it seems as
though she probably followed the truism that if a court is
determined to apply a standard of review more leniently or more
strictly than usual, it will do so. One of the advantages of strict
scrutiny, however, is that when the court does apply it more
leniently, it is readily apparent and will be noted by the Court's
critics, as was the case with the dissenters in Grutter.

187.
Id. at 2370 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291, 320 (1978) (opinion of
188.
Powell, J.) (holding that race can be used as a factor, but stating that "[r]acial and ethnic
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial
examination").
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2361 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
189.
part).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (stating that
190.
consistency requires that "all racial classifications reviewable under the Equal Protection
Clause must be strictly scrutinized").
See id. at 206-08 (identifying the "benign" purpose of the Small Business Act as
191.
the increased participation of socially and economically disadvantaged individuals); City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 470 (1989) (noting that the program
declared itself to be remedial, or "benign," in nature).
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IV. GRATZ v. BOLLINGER
A.

The Majority Opinion

Grutter cannot be fully understood without contrasting it
with the companion case of Gratz v. Bollinger.9' As noted
above,'93 Gratz involved a challenge to the undergraduate
admissions policy of the College of Literature, Science, and the
Arts (LSA) of the University of Michigan.'
Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote an opinion for the Court invalidating this
policy.'95 Justice O'Connor, the author of the Court's opinion in
Grutter,joined the Rehnquist opinion. '96 Justice Breyer concurred
in the judgment, resulting in six Justices voting to invalidate the
policy.'97 Relying on the Powell opinion in Bakke, not on Grutter,
the Court assumed that race can be used as a factor in the
admissions process as long as each application is given
individualized consideration and no single factor is allowed to
dominate the process.9 Under such an approach, which would
seem to be a fair reading of the Powell opinion in Bakke, the
Michigan undergraduate policy was easily invalidated.'99 The
Michigan policy gave points for a variety of diversity factors,
including twenty points for every underrepresented minority,
virtually guaranteeing admission to every otherwise-qualified
minority applicant. °° With such an admissions policy in place,
effective consideration of qualified minority applicants on an
individual basis had no impact on the outcome. The single factor
of race controlled the process. The majority illustrated how,
under this process, race overwhelmed virtually every other
factor, no matter how strong the application file of the competing
nonminority."' Thus, the Court rejected the policy for lack of
narrow tailoring. 2 ' The result seems correct either under the
Powell approach in Bakke or the majority approach in Grutter.
192.
123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
193.
Refer to text accompanying note 22 supra.
194.
Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2417-18.
195.
Id. at 2430-31.
196.
Id. at 2433 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
197.
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg dissented. See id. at 2434 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2438 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); id. at 2442 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
198.
Id. at 2428.
199.
Id. at 2428, 2430-31 ("The current LSA policy does not provide such
individualized consideration.").
200.
Id. at 2428.
201.
Id. at 2429.
202.
Id. at 2430.
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The opinion concluded by confronting Justice Ginsburg's
statement in her dissent that the Court's holding would simply
encourage the schools that are intent on maintaining their
minority enrollment at current levels to adopt more secretive
polices." 3 The majority noted that her statement seemed to
contradict the presumption of good faith indulged by the Grutter
Court.2 4 If Justice Ginsburg is correct, then the deference
accorded universities by the Grutter Court may be unwarranted.
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg's statement seems to suggest that
the Court should tailor its constitutional principles to avoid
potential disobedience by recalcitrant institutions, which flies in
the face of the Court's proper role in the constitutional system. In
any event, in light of the broad leeway Grutter gives to
educational institutions in designing racial preference policies, it
is difficult to see why they would need to be secretive. Most, if not
all, schools should be able to maintain their racial diversity in a
perfectly open and legal manner.
B. The Concurrencesand Dissents
Justice O'Connor joined the Court's opinion but wrote a
short concurrence emphasizing that "the selection index, by
setting up automatic, predetermined point allocations for the
soft variables, ensures that the diversity contributions of
applicants cannot be individually assessed."" 5 She emphasized
that this was "in sharp contrast" with the system used by the
Michigan Law School.0 6 She noted that the review committee,
which had some authority to reconsider files, did not have the
power to ameliorate the unconstitutional characteristics of the
program."' Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment of the
Court and joined Justice O'Connor's concurrence, but did not
join Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court.2 8 Justice
O'Connor's and Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions take largely
the same approach, though Chief Justice Rehnquist relied all
2 °9 making it
but exclusively on Bakke rather than Grutter,
203.
Id. at 2446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2430 n.22.
Id. at 2430 n.22.
204.
205.
Id. at 2432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
206.
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
207.
Id. at 2432-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing the committee's limitations).
208.
Id. at 2433 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
209.
Compare id. at 2427-31 (analyzing the LSA's admissions program and concluding
that "[n]othing in Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke signaled that a university may employ
whatever means it desires to achieve the stated goal of diversity without regard to the limits
imposed by our strict scrutiny analysis"), with id. at 2431-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(discussing the mechanical nature of the undergraduate admissions program and finding that
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unclear why Justice Breyer concurred in one but not the
other.21 °
Justice Souter dissented, arguing that the undergraduate
admissions process was closer to that which had been upheld in
Grutter than that which was condemned in Bakke." First,
Justice Souter maintained that there was nothing inconsistent
with the Bakke plus-in-the-file approach in the undergraduate
method of assigning predetermined point values to the various
diversifying factors.2 This contention turns on how "nuanced"
the individualized review in Bakke must be. Arguably, the review
would be individualized enough if each factor carried a
predetermined weight and in each case the points were simply
added up and ranked. Such a system might be an efficient
process for a large school overwhelmed with applications. It
would also be fairly transparent, and by minimizing
individualized discretion might promote consistency and fairness.
So Justice Souter is probably correct in arguing that the mere
assignment of points is not necessarily inconsistent with Bakke's
requirement of individualized and competitive review. It does,
however, seem to be inconsistent with the Grutter majority's
reading of Bakke, which appears to require the exercise of
discretion with respect to all comparisons between applicants, at
least with regard to the consideration of "soft variables.""' The
Grutter interpretation of the Bakke approach would seem to
maximize the extent to which each applicant is evaluated as a
unique individual, at least when considering those factors that
the school deems worthy of special consideration. For Justice
O'Connor, this is apparently the price of the diversity
justification, and as she is the key to the correct constitutional
understanding of the use of racial preferences, her views are the
law.
Justice Souter also argued that, under Bakke, it should not
matter whether race carried a determinative or neardeterminative weight in the mix of diversifying factors.24 On this
point, Justice Souter is clearly wrong. As explained in Bakke by
Justice Powell and illustrated by the Harvard plan, there must
it fails to meet the requirements of both Bakke and Grutter).
210.
Id. at 2433-34 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
211.
Id. at 2440-43 (Souter, J., dissenting).
212.
Id. at 2440-41 (Souter, J., dissenting).
213.
See id. at 2431 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct.
2325, 2343-44 (2003)).
214. Id. at 2441 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The very nature of a college's permissible
practice of awarding value to racial diversity means that race must be considered in a way
that increases some applicants' chances for admission.").
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be real and meaningful individualized consideration and a true
competitive process if race is to be utilized at all.215 Justice Powell
made it clear that all diversity factors need not be weighted the
same, 216 and presumably that race can be given more weight, as
often will be the case. It should be obvious, however, that there
must be reasonable limitations on such differential weighting if a
true competitive process is to be preserved. Race could be given
so much weight that it would trump any combination of other
diversifying factors, and if that were the case, then clearly any
claim of individualized consideration would be a sham. Justice
Souter did not believe this to be the case with the process before
the Court, given that it would have been possible to accumulate a
score surpassing the racial preference through a combination of
other factors. 217 As the Court illustrated, however, such an
occurrence would be the rare exception rather than the rule
considering the weight of race in the calculus. 218 Although it is
true that some nonminorities had the capability of accumulating
scores higher than underrepresented minorities, the fact remains
that virtually all qualified minorities would have been
guaranteed admission under the procedure. 219 Thus, although

some nonminorities had the capability to compete with minorities
because there were far more seats in the class than there were
minority applicants, minimally qualified minorities did not have
to compete with anyone at all. 220 They were in. This was not the

type of competitive process envisioned by either Justice Powell or
the Harvard plan.22 ' If Justice Souter believes that it is, then he
simply has not read the Powell opinion very carefully.
It appears that the Michigan undergraduate approach was
rejected not simply because the weight given to race was so large
as to nullify real individualized competition, but also because the
approach was simply too mechanical, period. Although the second
conclusion does not inevitably flow from Bakke, it now appears to
be the law.

215.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-18 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
Id. at 317-18 (opinion of Powell, J.).
216.
Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2440-41 (Souter, J., dissenting).
217.
Id. at 2429.
218.
219.
See id. (giving an example of the procedure in action).
220.
See id. (stating that every qualified minority applicant "would simply be
admitted").
221.
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-18 (opinion of Powell, J.) (noting that the Harvard
plan allowed race or ethnic background to be a "plus" for a particular applicant, but did
not "insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available
seats").
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GRU7TER AND GRATZ SYNTHESIZED

A. What Universities May Do
The combined decisions of Grutter and Gratz are useful
because they provide an example of an admissions policy that is
constitutionally acceptable alongside one that is not-unlike
Bakke, which involved an example of an unacceptable approach
but only speculation (by one Justice) about what would be
constitutional. The two opinions read together tell us much. The
following appears to be settled.
First, the use of racial preferences in admissions processes of
institutions of higher education can be constitutional.222 If an
institution chooses to use race as a factor in the evaluation
process, strict scrutiny will apply; 223 however, the strict scrutiny

employed will be far more deferential to the expertise and
judgment of educational institutions than is normally the case.224
The use of race to achieve either diversity or the educational
benefits that flow from diversity will be considered a compelling
state interest; 2 5 however, the concept of diversity remains illdefined and seems to encompass not simply the benefits that flow
from interchange between students with different backgrounds
and perspectives, but also the benefits that flow from increased
minority representation in business, the military, government,
and other positions of leadership. 22 As long as an institution of
higher learning purports to be using race to achieve such
diversity, the Court will not require the institution to prove
further that educational benefits do indeed flow from diversity in
general or racial diversity in particular;2 7 the existence of such
benefits was definitively resolved by the Court in Grutter.2 s A
mission statement explaining what the university is attempting
to achieve might prove useful in justifying the system that the
university employs.229
222.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003) (holding that the "Equal
Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in
admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits
that flow from a diverse student body").
223.
See id. at 2338.
224.
See id. at 2339 (citing to prior Supreme Court cases that were also deferential to
universities' educational decisions).
225.
See id. at 2338-39.
226.
See id. at 2339-40.
227.
See id. at 2339 (stating that the Court will defer to the Law School's judgment
that diversity will assist its "educational mission").
228.
See id. at 2339-40 (listing the education benefits diversity produces in all cases).
229.
See id. at 2339 ("The Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is

2004]

GRUTTER AND GRATZ

495

Second, race may only be used as a factor in admissions
pursuant to an individualized, competitive process in which all
relevant diversifying factors are taken into account. 2 ° All factors
need not be given the same weight, and presumably race may be
given significantly greater weight than other diversifying
factors. 231' Race can be used as a plus-in-the-file, at least as long
as the race in question is otherwise underrepresented in the
applicant pool-usually as a result of past discrimination.2 32 An
educational institution may attempt to achieve a critical mass of
minority students for the purpose of ensuring that such students
do not feel too isolated to participate in the academic
interchange. 233 Apparently,
the institution may create
different
critical
masses
for
significantly
different
underrepresented minority groups. 34 An attempt to achieve such
critical mass, including closely monitoring acceptance of offers of
admission extended to minority students, will not give rise to an
inference that the institution is maintaining a quota.2 3' An
institution largely satisfies the requirement of narrow tailoring
by taking account of all relevant diversifying factors in an
individualized and competitive process. 36 If challenged, it might
be helpful if the institution can show that some nonminorities
were admitted with lower academic indicators than those of
underrepresented minorities who were rejected, though this is
probably not essential.2 37
Third, the institution is under an obligation to consider race
neutral alternatives that serve its overall mission almost as well
as the use of racial preferences.2 8 However, it need not
significantly sacrifice its academic reputation by lowering
admission requirements or instituting a lottery. 9 Instead, the
essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer."). '
230.
See id. at 2343 (noting that individualized consideration is "paramount").
231.
See id. at 2343-44 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 483 U.S. 265
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
232.
See id. at 2345-46.
See id. at 2333 (finding a program that used critical mass to avoid isolation
233.
constitutional).
See id. at 2366-68 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the "alleged goal of
234.
'critical mass'" as a "sham").
235.
See id. at 2343.
236.
See id. (describing the constitutional process used by the Law School as a
"highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file").
237.
See id. at 2344 (viewing the fact that the Law School "frequently accepts
nonminority applicants with grades and test scores lower than underrepresented minority
applicants ... who are rejected" in a positive light).
238.
See id. at 2345 (holding that narrow tailoring requires "good faith consideration
of... race-neutral alternatives").
239.
See id. (finding such sacrifices to be "drastic" and uncalled for).
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institution should build a sunset provision into its racial
preference policy, conduct periodic reviews to ensure that the
policy is serving its purpose, and work to develop race neutral
alternatives that will provide racial diversity without the use of
racial preferences. 24' The steps may be necessary in the future,
for it is possible that the Court will no longer permit the use of
racial preferences twenty-five years from the date of the decision
in Grutter, that is, in the year 2028.241
Finally, on all issues-including whether there is a
compelling interest, whether the institution is actually
attempting to achieve the compelling interest that it has set
forth, whether it is actually attempting to do something it has no
right to do, such as employ a quota, whether its admissions
program is as individualized and competitive as it purports to be,
whether it is misusing the concept of critical mass, whether its
admissions policy is producing the results that were intended,
and whether it has considered race neutral alternatives-the
Court will assume, absent a strong showing to the contrary, that
the university is acting in good faith and will defer to its
academic judgment.242
B. What UniversitiesMay Not Do
On the other hand, Grutter and Gratz combined also
recognize that an institution may not employ racial preferences
in the form of quotas or set-asides, or employ a two-track
admissions program in which minorities are insulated from
competition with nonminorities. 2" Likewise, an attempt to use a
simply to create racial balance or
racial preference
proportionality is unconstitutional.24 4 This prohibition is
confusing, however, in that it seems to be quite permissible to
employ a diversity-based racial preference program for the
purpose of ensuring that there will be an adequate supply of
underrepresented minorities trained to assume positions of
leadership throughout society.245 A diversity-based admissions
process that does not include a wide range of seemingly relevant
240.
See id. at 2346-47 (suggesting that such measures would satisfy the "durational
requirement").
See id. at 2347 (hypothesizing that, in twenty-five years, racial preferences will
241.
not longer be necessary to achieve diversity).
See id. at 2339, 2341-46.
242.
243.
See id. at 2342 (holding that neither a quota nor putting applicants on "separate
admissions tracks" will meet the requirement of a narrowly tailored program).
See id. at 2339.
244.
245.
See id. at 2339-40 (recognizing the need for diverse leaders both within
American businesses and military).
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nonracial factors would probably be subject to challenge on
narrow tailoring grounds.246 It appears that an institution may
not operate a diversity-based admissions program by assigning
predetermined numerical weights to the factors considered.2 47
Rather, it must engage in a careful "holistic" (to use Justice
O'Connor's phrase) evaluation of all relevant factors.14' A
diversity program that places overwhelming weight on race,
whether or not reduced to a numerical figure so that as a
practical matter race predominates over all other diversity
factors, would be unconstitutional.2 49 An institution may not
justify the use of racial preferences on the basis of societal
discrimination, although the Court's emphasis on the importance
of training underrepresented minorities for positions of
leadership is arguably based on a societal discrimination theory,
as Justice Thomas noted. 5 ° Presumably, the use of race for
purposes of providing a remedy for identified past discrimination
would need to meet the rigorous standards set forth in the Powell
opinion in Bakke and the Croson and Adarand opinions. 5 '
Although the Court has imposed some very real restraints
on the use of race by educational institutions, it has also given
them an exceedingly wide berth to use race in properly
constructed diversity programs, and it has sent a clear message
that as long as the institutions remain within these relatively
generous boundaries, they will not be subject to judicial second
guessing. As such, Grutter and Gratz represent a significant
victory for institutions of higher education.

246.
See id. at 2345 (finding that the Law School's program satisfied the narrowly
tailored program requirement because it "considers 'all pertinent elements of diversity'").
247.
See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2429-30 (2003) (finding the University
of Michigan's point-based system unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored).
248.
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2343.
249.
See id. at 2342-44 (approving the Law School's admissions program in part
because race and ethnicity were not used as "defining feature[s]" in the application
process).
250.
Id. at 2361 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
251.
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (agreeing with
the Court's prior determination in Croson that strict scrutiny should be applied to racial
classifications and rejecting the application of intermediate scrutiny to benign racial
classifications in Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)); City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (stating that racial classifications are "strictly
reserved for remedial settings"); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 29699 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (developing the basis for the narrowly tailored standard
that is to be used when racial classifications are made).

498

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[41:2

C. What Was Not Decided (At Least Explicitly)
The use of racial preferences in admissions can be a
complicated matter, and the Michigan cases do not, nor did they
attempt to, answer every question that might arise. Institutions
will structure their admissions programs differently based on
their needs, their resources, and their particular educational
objectives. Perhaps the safest approach for institutions would be
to design their admissions programs as closely to the Michigan
Law School's as possible. This approach will not work for all
institutions, however, just as the Harvard plan in Bakke is not
appropriate for many schools. The typical university or graduate
program does not find itself in the same position as Harvard or
Michigan. The elite schools are overwhelmed with thousands of
applications from highly qualified candidates.25 2 Their task is to
decide how and why to reject hundreds, if not thousands, of
students who could clearly compete academically in their schools.
Thus, the issue for the selective schools is as much one of
exclusion as inclusion. This simply is not the position in which
most schools find themselves. Rather, they are attempting,
sometimes struggling, to fill a class with students who are
capable of doing the work in a competitive manner. The less
selective, or more typical, schools do not have the rich pools of
highly diverse applicants, nor could they afford to prefer many
diverse students over more academically qualified students even
if they did. Consequently, simply attempting to copy the Harvard
or Michigan approach will be difficult and costly for many, if not
most, institutions. Nevertheless, like Harvard and Michigan,
these institutions would almost certainly like to achieve some
degree of racial diversity.253 To do so, they might not be able to
practically take account of as many nonracial diversifying factors
and, as such, it might be more difficult for them to build a record
equivalent to that of the Michigan Law School.
The Michigan approach will be costly for most institutions,
including selective institutions, in another way as well. Gratz
officers from according
seems to preclude admissions
predetermined numerical weights to the various diversity

Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 814 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (noting that the
252.
University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts received 13,500
applications in 1997), rev'd in part, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321
(Appendix to Opinion of Powell, J., Harvard College Admissions Program) (stating that
each year the number of applications that Harvard receives greatly exceeds the size of its
entering class and that the number of unqualified applicants is comparatively small).
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340 (describing the benefits of a diverse student
253.
body).
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factors.254 One, if not the primary, reason for a numerical
approach would be to conserve time and resources."' A more
mechanical approach does not require nearly as many admissions
officers as an intuitive holistic process does. For schools with
limited applicant pools, reading every file and making
individualized comparisons does not pose a great burden.25 6
Many, if not most, such schools have probably engaged in
individualized review all along.25 7 Schools with larger applicant
pools, however, including some highly selective schools and state
universities, may need to hire larger admissions staffs if they
have been employing the type of mechanical approach struck
down in Gratz.5 5 Presumably, they will be willing to bear the cost
in order to maintain racial diversity.
One question of degree that is not definitively settled by the
Michigan cases is how many relevant diversity factors the
institution must take into account in addition to race.
Presumably, the more multi-factored, the better. Should a school
determine that it is interested in race plus three or four other
factors, but not in the entire gamut of arguably relevant facets of
an individual, it is unclear whether the Court will be willing to
extend the same degree of deference to its policy as it did to the
Michigan Law School's. In the narrow tailoring section of its
opinion, the Grutter Court emphasized repeatedly that the Law
School had considered all conceivable diversifying factors.255
In Grutter, the Court approved of a policy under which the
Michigan Law School gave a significant plus-in-the-file to
otherwise qualified applicants from three underrepresented
minority groups. 6 ° Yet it is not clear whether racial preferences
may only be employed with respect to "underrepresented" groups.
Presumably, few institutions would want to give a preference to a
group that was already well represented, but in the event that
254. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2429-31 (discussing University of Michigan's point system
and finding it unconstitutional).
255. See id. at 2430 (discussing the university's argument that individualized
consideration would be impractical).
256. See Brief for Respondents at 5-6 & 6 n.8, Gratz (No. 02-516) (stating that the
Michigan Law School is an example of a school that can realistically use an individualized
admissions process) [hereinafter Gratz Respondents' Brief].
257. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321-24 (Appendix to Opinion of Powell, J., Harvard
College Admissions Program) (stating that for the thirty years prior to the Court's
decision in 1978, Harvard had individually screened the majority of its applicants).
258. See Gratz Respondents' Brief, supra note 256, at 5-6 (stating that the
University of Michigan employs twenty full-time admissions counselors and that even
using the mechanical process they work almost year-round reviewing applications).
259. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2342-45.
260. Id. at 2332 (describing the Law School's process as using a "plus" factor and
holding it constitutional).
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one did, it is unclear whether that decision would be entitled to
much, if any, deference. Arguably it would not, given the
emphasis in Grutter on the need to ensure that the system is
open to all races and the implication that racial preference
policies must end when they are no longer needed. The concept of
underrepresentation is obviously comparative in nature. A group
can only be underrepresented if there is some notion of proper or
adequate representation, as Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out
during oral argument.261 Unless we know what is proper
representation, there is no way to determine whether a group is
underrepresented. There are a variety of benchmarks to choose
from, however. Representation might be judged by comparison to
the group's percentage in the national population or its
population in the state or city in which the institution is located,
to a percentage in the school's applicant pool or percentage in the
national applicant pool, to the percentage admissible without the
use of racial preferences, or to the percentage of admitted
members who choose to attend if admitted without racial
preferences. Each of these might yield a different figure.
Arguably, the most appropriate comparison would be between
the percentage of a particular minority group's members in the
applicant pool and the percentage of that group admissible in the
absence of racial preferences. As Croson indicates, comparison to
a nonqualified pool would be of little relevance.262 On the other
hand, the emphasis in the Grutter opinion on ensuring the
production of a leadership corps from all segments of society
suggests that a focus on the national population may be the
appropriate benchmark.
There is little question that the three racial groups favored
by the Michigan Law School would probably be underrepresented
in most universities and professional schools and, as such, the
schools could utilize racial preferences to attempt to admit
critical masses of these students.264 Presumably, there would not
be a problem if, in the future, a university determined that other
racial or ethnic groups, such as Arabs or Asians, were
underrepresented and should be given a preference under a
diversity program-as long as there was a record to support the
Grutter Transcript, supra note 152, at 34-35 (questioning by Chief Justice
261.
Rehnquist of John Payton, attorney for the University of Michigan).
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501-04 (1989).
262.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339-41 (2003) (describing the
263.
benefits that diversity bestows on educational institutions, American businesses, and the
military).
See id. at 2345-47 (upholding the Law School's admissions practice that
264.
included some racial preferences).
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claim of underrepresentation. Grutter suggests that the courts
would certainly defer to such a conclusion.2 65 The more
interesting question is whether an underrepresented minority
group that the university chose not to prefer could claim a
constitutional right to such a preference. 6 Arguably, the broad
deference that the Court seems prepared to accord to universities
with respect to admissions decisions would also extend to the
question of which groups are worthy of preference. On the other
hand, if two racial groups are similarly situated in terms of
underrepresentation, as well as in the potential for offering
diverse perspectives, the failure to include one while including
the other would seem to be a case of unjustified racial
discrimination capable of giving rise to a claim for violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. It would be wise for admissions officials
to think through decisions regarding the creation of racial
preferences carefully and to attempt to accord similarly situated
groups parity of treatment rather than simply to assume that the
courts will defer to whatever the university decides to do.
Grutter and Gratz probably would not preclude a school from
adopting automatic admission and denial lines based on a
combination of traditional academic indicators, such as grades
and test scores, as long as the lines were the same for all races.267
Presumably, the automatic denial line would be set at a level
below which the school had concluded applicants would be unable
to perform in an academically competitive manner. The
automatic admission line would be set at a point above which the
school had concluded students would be likely to perform very
well academically. The use of such an automatic admissionrejection system would not mean that schools could not admit
minority students with significantly lower academic indicators
than nonminority students, as the very point of Grutter was to
hold that they could. It would simply have to be done on an
individualized and competitive basis. Any automatic screening
would need to be done on a race neutral basis.
Nothing in Grutter or Gratz addresses the important
question of racial preferences with respect to scholarships. Is it
permissible for a state university to offer scholarships that are
available only to members of underrepresented minority groups?
Presumably, doing so would not be consistent with the theory of
265.
See id. at 2339 (describing the Court's deference to a school's "educational
mission" and judgments).
266.
See id. at 2349-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that such lawsuits will be
forthcoming).
267.
See id. at 2345 (mentioning automatic admission programs and their potential
downfalls but abstaining from attacking their constitutionality).
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the Court in the Michigan cases. If it is unconstitutional to
operate a set-aside or two-track system with respect to
admission, there is no reason why it should be any more
constitutional to do so with respect to the important issue of the
distribution of financial assistance. The wise course would be to
establish diversity-based scholarship aid to be distributed with
consideration of all diversity-oriented factors.26 It would probably
not be a problem if a very significant share was distributed to
students who added diversity on the basis of race, but it would be
important for such aid also to be given to students who
contributed to the diversity of the student body in other ways.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits educational
institutions that receive federal funding from discriminating on
the basis of race.26 9 As a practical matter, this covers almost all
institutions of higher learning. In Bakke, five members of the
Court held that Congress meant for Title VI to be interpreted in
exactly the same way as the Equal Protection Clause with
respect to the legality of racial classifications.2 7 ° When a state
institution such as the University of Michigan is involved, Title
VI has little independent significance, as it merely duplicates
equal protection. Title VI is very important with respect to
private institutions, however, because state action is rarely
present. The plaintiffs in both Michigan cases relied on Title VI
as well as equal protection and, given that the right protected by
Title VI is coextensive with the equal protection right, the Court
in Grutter summarily rejected the Title VI claim,271 and the Court
in Gratz found a violation.7 2 An important byproduct of these
decisions is that, because of Title VI, private universities are
effectively accorded the same protection with respect to the use of
racial preferences as the Michigan Law School in Grutter and are
placed under the same constraints as the Michigan
undergraduate college in Gratz.

268.
Maurice Dyson, In Search of the Talented Tenth: Diversity, Affirmative Access,
and University-Driven Reform, 6 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 41, 47 (2003) (noting that racebased scholarships have recently come under attack).
269.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
270.
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.); id. at 325 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, & White, JJ., concurring in the
judgment in part).
271.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347.
272.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2430 & n.23 (2003).
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WERE THERE TWO DIFFERENT COMPELLING
STATE INTERESTS?

In analyzing an admissions policy that employs racial
preferences, it seems to be important to know why the university
is doing what it does. In Bakke, the university set forth four
justifications-increasing the number of minority students,
increasing the number of doctors who practice in underserved
communities, providing a remedy for past societal discrimination,
and creating diversity in the educational process.273 All but
diversity were rejected by Justice Powell, so diversity became the
preferred rationale for institutions desiring to utilize racial
preferences in admission.2"4 A large number of institutions use
racial preferences and will almost certainly continue to do so. But
is diversity really the primary reason?
At least some universities, especially those in the Deep
South, employ racial preferences as a remedy for their own past
discrimination, often pursuant to consent decree; but they are the
exception rather than the rule.2 75 Most schools talk the talk of
diversity and will certainly continue to do so, as Grutter has
approved the diversity rationale and granted the universities
much judicial deference. In Grutter itself, however, Justice
Kennedy cited various law review articles suggesting that the
desire for diversity may not be the main reason for the
widespread use of racial preferences in university admissions.2 76
There is doubtlessly some truth in this observation. Racial
preferences are probably utilized for a number of reasons,
including diversity, but the diversity justification may not always
be the driving force behind them.
Most academics would probably agree with the conclusions
drawn by Harvard and Justice Powell with respect to the value to
the academic process, both in classroom and in informal
situations as a result of diverse perspectives, viewpoints, and
Refer to notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
273.
274.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12 (opinion of Powell, J.) (describing a diverse student
body as "a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education").
See Daniel Golden, Not Black and White: Colleges Cut Back Minority Programs
275.
After Court Rulings, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2003, at Al (describing a consent decree in
Tennessee that requires scholarships to overcome a heritage of segregation).
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2373 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy
276.
quoted Professor Schuck of the Yale Law School for the proposition that "many academics
at other law schools who are 'affirmative action's more forthright defenders readily
concede that diversity is merely the current rationale of convenience for a policy that they
prefer to justify on other grounds."' Id. (quoting Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past,
Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 34 (2002)). He also cited Sanford
Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573, 577-78 (2000) and Jed Rubenfeld,
Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 471 (1997).
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backgrounds. To this extent, diversity is not a sham or a facade.
For the most part, academics do believe that a diverse class is a
more interesting class and a class better able to contribute to the
educations of one another. 277 As Grutter, Gratz, and Hopwood
illustrate, the commitment of universities to racial diversity far
outstrips their commitment to other forms of diversity. 278 In
Grutter, for example, the Michigan Law School had made it clear
that it had a special commitment to racial diversity. 9
By definition, giving a student a plus-in-the file for diverse
characteristics, certainly a significant plus, usually means that a
student with lower academic indicators is being preferred over one
with higher indicators. Otherwise, the "diverse" student would be
admitted based on grades and test scores alone without need of a
preference. Thus, although diversity may have benefits, it also has
costs. Significant reliance on diversity in admissions can result in a
lowering of the institution's mean and median GPA and test
scores.211 In a competitive academic environment, this is a cost that
is taken quite seriously. 8 ' Generally, institutions are willing to drop
their academic predictors much farther to achieve racial diversity
than to achieve any other type of diversity. 282 To a significant extent,
this is attributable to the small size of the pool of highly qualified
minority, especially African American, applicants.2 2 This is
essentially the Achilles' heel of Justice Powell's diversity approach.
If relatively selective schools simply treat race as a plus-in-the-file,
277.
See Brief Amicus Curiae for the Association of American Law Schools in
Support of Petitioner at 49-51, Bakke (No. 76-811) (noting that "[t]he admission
decision ... rests upon the judgment of schools that the existence of this diversity will
contribute to the education of other students in the class").
278.
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332 (noting the "Law School's longstanding
commitment to 'one particular type of diversity,' that is, 'racial and ethnic diversity with
special reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have been historically
discriminated against'"); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2003)
(describing the point system that gave additional points based solely on race); Hopwood v.
Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 560 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (discussing the admissions procedures
designed to increase the admission of racial minorities), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
279.
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332 (describing the admissions policy, which
specifically sought to enroll a critical mass of racial minorities).
280. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 796-97 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Boggs,
J., dissenting) (indicating that "race is worth over one full grade point of college average
or at least an 11-point and 20-percentile boost on the LSAT"), affd, 123 S.Ct. 2325 (2003);
see also Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 563 n.32 (noting that the median GPA for all incoming
University of Texas Law School students for the 1992 entering class was 3.52, for black
incoming students was 3.30, and for Mexican American incoming students was 3.24).
281.
See America's Best Graduate Schools 2005: Law Methodology, at http://www.
usnews.com/usnews/edu/grad/rankings/about/05_lawmethbrief.php (noting that LSAT
scores and GPA are two of twelve measures considered when determining rankings).
282.
See Brief of the Law School Admission Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 9-11, Grutter (No. 02-241).
283.
Id. at 8-9.
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worth somewhat more but not too much more than other
diversifying factors, they will not achieve very much racial diversity
and certainly will not achieve a critical mass of minority students.
There simply are not enough highly qualified minority students to
satisfy the demand for racial diversity, even with a modest plus-inthe-file.1 4 Consequently, institutions such as the University of
Texas Law School, the University of Michigan undergraduate
program, and arguably the University of Michigan Law School,
pushed the envelope beyond what was permissible under a fair
reading of Bakke in order to achieve the degree of racial diversity
they desired. The Law School's critical mass approach in Grutter
may have been an attempt to admit more minority students than a
mere plus-in-the-file approach could yield. It is likely that more
litigation would have revealed other universities doing the same.
Perhaps universities are willing to sacrifice academic
indicators to a greater extent to achieve racial diversity because
they have concluded that, given the history and role of race in
America, racial diversity actually adds more to the academic
exchange. It may also be true that institutions are willing to
sacrifice academic indicators to a greater degree to achieve racial
diversity because they are driven by more than the educational
benefits of diversity. It is likely that some university administrators
believe that racial preferences should be used as a remedy for past
societal discrimination, even though that theory has been rejected
by the Supreme Court."5 There is also doubtlessly some truth in
Justice Thomas's observation that racial preferences are often
adopted for, as he put it, "aesthetic" purposes. 8 ' That is, many
university administrators and faculty members believe that, ideally,
racial minorities should be represented in social institutions to some
significant extent, and the absence of such representation makes
them sufficiently uncomfortable to alter admissions standards to
achieve it.287 In other words, part of the explanation for the use of
strong racial preferences is a need to make permanent members of
the academic community feel good about themselves and their
institutions.28 8

Id.
284.
See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978) (opinion
285.
of Powell, J.) (describing the California program as "helping certain groups whom the
faculty of the Davis Medical School perceived as victims of 'societal discrimination'").
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2352 n.3 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
286.
part and dissenting in part).
See id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defining the
287.
aesthetic interest as the Law School's desire for a certain appearance "from the shape of
the desks and tables in its classrooms to the color of the students").
288.
Schuck, supra note 276, at 36-37, 70.
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There is reason to believe that at least among selective
schools, one, if not the primary, rationale for the use of racial
preferences in admissions is a desire to produce a significant
number of minority, especially African American, graduates who
will contribute to the building of a solid minority middle class
and will be able to assume leadership positions throughout
society. 289 This justification was set forth in detail by former
President of Princeton William Bowen and former President of
Harvard Derek Bok in their influential book, The Shape of the
River, cited by the majority in Grutter.2 0 The Bowen-Bok
rationale seemed particularly important to the business and
2 9 ' And
retired military amici in Grutter.
it is especially applicable
in the context of law schools, given that lawyers play a pivotal
role in protecting legal rights and also tend to hold a
disproportionate number of leadership positions, as the Court
29 2 While
recognized in Grutter.
it is probable that university
administrators acted on the Bowen-Bok rationale in designing
admissions policies that emphasized racial diversity over other
types of diversity, undoubtedly they did not feel free to defend
their programs under this rationale given that it bears some
similarities to two justifications explicitly rejected by Justice
Powell in Bakke-simply increasing the number of minority
students and graduates and attempting to provide more doctors
likely to serve currently underserved communities.9
Arguably, Justice Powell rejected these rationales, especially
the first one, too quickly. 294 The first rationale, increasing the
number of minority graduates, may be stronger and more
289.
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2329 (identifying law school as "the training ground
for a large number of the Nation's leaders").
290.
Id. at 2340. Several commentators made note of this prior to the Grutter
decision. See Samuel Issacharoff, Law and Misdirection in the Debate Over Affirmative
Action, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 11, 23 (stating that integrating African Americans into the
mainstream of American society is the early explanation for why universities employ
strong racial preferences); Terrance Sandalow, Minority Preferences Reconsidered, 97
MICH. L. REV. 1874, 1911-12 (1999) (book review) (reviewing The Shape of the River and
arguing that the best justification for racial preferences may be inclusion of minorities in
institutions that lead to power and prestige); Schuck, supra note 276, at 30-32
(recognizing but criticizing the minority leadership justification).
291.
Refer to notes 95-104 supra and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
treatment of the briefs submitted by the military officers and the business community).
292.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
293.
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307, 310-11 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.) (rejecting the first ground as facially invalid and the second because
the school had not met the burden of showing the ethnic group preference is needed "to
promote better health-care delivery to deprived citizens").
294.
Sandalow, supra note 290, at 1911 (arguing that, in his haste, Justice Powell
may have missed the most important justification for minority preferences-the benefit of
minority leadership throughout society).
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persuasive in the context of selective colleges and law schools
than in the context of medical schools.295 It is unfortunate that by
labeling this rational per se unconstitutional, Justice Powell
ruled it out of bounds in all circumstances without considering
implications outside the Bakke context. It is unlikely that many
universities or professional schools would attempt to admit
minority students merely for purposes of racial balancing or
proportionality with no other goals in mind, knowing that such
practices are unconstitutional. Rather, it is more likely that in
addition to the benefits of classroom diversity, educators believe
that increasing the number of underrepresented minority
students would result in the building of a solid minority middle
class, which over time would hopefully ensure that the minorities
in question would no longer be underrepresented.2 "'
Consequently, increasing the number of minority students in the
medical school class was not an end in itself, but rather a means
to another goal that surely need not be unconstitutional per se.
But after Bakke, it appeared that diversity and provision of a
remedy for the school's own past discrimination, where
applicable, were the only justifications on which schools could
rely.297
The Grutter majority in a rather clumsy way brought the
Bowen-Bok rationale under the tent of diversity. Indeed, the
opinion places far more emphasis on the minority leadership
rationale than on the traditional theory of academic interchange
diversity as emphasized by the Powell opinion. 2" The Grutter
Court's discussion of business's need for persons with different
backgrounds, the military's need for officers from minority
groups, and society's need for leaders all point in this direction.299
Yet this rationale does not meld easily with the diversity theory.
Indeed, it seems to be in tension with it. Under diversity, race is
only one factor, even if it is an important one. However, race is
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313-14 (opinion of Powell, J.) (admitting that such a
295.
rationale may be more persuasive in the undergraduate and legal settings).
Sandalow, supra note 290, at 1899 ("Whatever doubts may exist about the
296.
significance of college-level minority preference policies in increasing the number of black
professionals, Bowen and Bok's data impressively demonstrate the importance of those
policies in augmenting the representation of blacks in the upper reaches of the middle
class.").
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307, 311-12 (opinion of Powell, J.) (identifying legitimate
297.
interests as "ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified
discrimination" and "the attainment of a diverse student body").
Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339-40 (2003) (discussing
298.
diversity's interpersonal benefits in one paragraph), with id. at 2340-41 (spending five
paragraphs discussing the societal benefits).
Refer to notes 99-110 supra and accompanying text (explaining the Court's
299.
decision).
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the driving force behind the leadership rationale. It has the
potential of reducing the other diversifying factors to mere
window dressing, a dance that institutions must perform in order
to be allowed to achieve what they are really seeking-an
increase in the number of minority graduates who will hopefully
play significant roles in society at large. °0
The Court was certainly correct to recognize the importance
of permitting institutions to attempt to increase the number of
minority graduates for the overall benefit of society. °1 The
opinion would have been more persuasive, however, if it had
recognized increasing the number of minority graduates for
leadership purposes as a separate rationale from diversity and
held that both were compelling state interests. Such an approach
carries with it obvious difficulties of its own, however, that
render it legally impracticable. It is arguable that focusing on
creating a well-educated and well-trained contingent of
minorities throughout society would lead to implicit quotas, but
it is hard to see why such an approach would be any more
conducive to quotas than the critical mass approach explicitly
blessed by the Court. If anything, there would be a more logical
stopping point under the minority leadership approach than
under the more traditional diversity approach. The point at
which a solid core of potential minority leaders has been created
seems to be more determinable. Arguably, the value of diversity,
including racial diversity, in the academic process will never end.
It might be charged that a minority leadership rationale is
simply another way of explaining Justice Brennan's societal
discrimination approach." 2 This is not the case, however. The
minority leadership rationale is unconcerned with the reasons for
the underrepresentation of minorities in selective educational
institutions. Whether it is due to a significant extent to past
discrimination, as is probably the case with African Americans,
or due largely to language and cultural differences, which may be
the case with Latinos and other relatively recent immigrant
groups, the problem remains worth addressing.
Perhaps the greatest constitutional drawback to the
recognition of creating an educated group of potential minority
leaders as a compelling interest is that it does not seem to
require the same individualized and competitive evaluation
process as the Powell diversity process does. Presumably there is
300.
See Post, supra note 69, at 69-70.
301.
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340-41.
302.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (articulating Justice
Brennan's approach-that measures to remediate past discrimination are constitutional).
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not nearly as great an interest in ensuring that diverse but
nonracial groups also produce an educated middle class, as this
probably occurs without preferential treatment. If producing a
core group of well-educated minorities was in fact recognized as a
compelling interest, then presumably a school would not need to
consider a plethora of other diversifying factors. Instead, it could
limit its preferences to race if it so chooses. This would cut too
deeply into the individualistic approach to equal protection that
Powell set forth in Bakke and that the Court has emphasized in
several other cases and appears committed to retaining, though
not without some compromise.0 3 While it would be possible to
recognize that producing a core of potential minority leaders is a
compelling interest, but that a school may only pursue this
interest through competitive consideration of nonminority
candidates with leadership potential, such a requirement would
distort the minority leadership rationale as much as the Court's
approach seems to distort the traditional diversity justification.
Given that the Court has provided a means by which
selective universities and professional schools can attempt to
admit a significant number of underrepresented minority
applicants, why should it matter whether the rationale is
coherent enough to please a law professor? One response is that
there is always a significant value to judicial candor. The area of
racial preferences, especially in education, has long been plagued
with subterfuge and disingenuousness." 4 Given that educational
institutions have been given a green light by the Court to use
racial preferences in a relatively powerful manner, it would be
useful if the legal justification was stated with the utmost clarity
and honesty. Combining the interest in classroom diversity with
the interest in producing a well-educated minority middle class
under the general heading of the "educational benefits of
diversity" may ultimately lead some institutions to accord race a
weight that will be difficult to justify under the traditional
academic diversity rationale on which the Court has largely
relied. Perhaps the broad deference to educational institutions
articulated by the Grutter majority will provide protection in
even such a case, but, at some point at least, if an institution
appears to be flouting the guidelines of Grutter and Gratz, it is
likely that plaintiffs will be prepared to take up a challenge.

303.
Id. at 289-90; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 218-23
(1995).
304.
Emanuel 0. Iheukwumere & Philip C. Aka, Title VII, Affirmative Action, and
the March Toward Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 11 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 1, 5455 (2001) (questioning the Court's motives regarding reverse discrimination cases).
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Moreover, the minority leadership justification would have
increased the decisionmaking autonomy of educational
institutions if it were in fact a constitutionally favored interest as
the Court indicates. An institution that desires to pursue
diversity under Justice Powell's rationale may certainly continue
to do so pursuant to the Grutter guidelines. On the other hand, a
school less interested in broad-based diversity but very interested
in producing a class likely to yield a sufficient number of
underrepresented minority graduates could do so without taking
account of other forms of diversity. Apparently this was not a
feasible option for the Court. The compromise that Bakke and
Grutter created to permit a relatively generous use of race in the
educational admissions process is the use of individualized
holistic file review along with a justification that purports to
benefit nonminorities to the same extent as minorities."°5 This is
the means by which the Court's individualistic equal protection
jurisprudence is squared with a fairly aggressive use of racial
preferences. This approach probably does not accurately reflect
what many universities are doing or why they are doing it, but it
purports to build on existing precedent and with the degree of
deference afforded educational institutions, 6 provides significant
protection against potential liability, and for that matter, even
litigation as long as the schools remain within the relatively
generous boundaries laid down by Grutter. Thus, universities
may use racial preferences to create a minority leadership class
as long as they call it diversity and do it the Michigan Law
School way.
VII. CONCLUSION

Grutter and Gratz were historic decisions. They go a long
way toward ending the legal battle over racial preferences in
higher education. Grutter is not an intellectually pleasing
opinion. It is poorly reasoned and disingenuous. It correctly
concludes that equal protection principles, as developed over time
by the Court, do not prohibit some use of racial preferences by
institutions of higher education in admissions. It does not explain
as clearly as it could why this is so. Though protesting loudly to
the contrary, the Court clearly did not apply anything like strict
scrutiny as it has been traditionally understood. The Michigan
Law School admissions policy purported to comply with Bakke on
its face. The plaintiffs, the district court, and the dissenters on
305.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2333 (pointing out that applicants of all races receive a
holistic and individualized review as recommended by Bakke).
306.
See id. at 2339, 2346.
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the Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court made a powerful case that
circumstantial evidence tended to show that the Law School was
in fact applying an implicit quota through the concept of critical
mass. The record did not clearly establish who was correct. As
such, the case came down to a question of presumptions. The
dissenters, especially Justice Kennedy, took the position that it
was the duty of the Law School, pursuant to strict scrutiny, to
explain suspicious aspects of its program and that it had simply
failed to do so.37 The majority responded by presuming good faith
on the part of the Law School and showing it extraordinary
deference with respect to questions concerning the use of racial
preferences in university admissions." 8 Although it is impossible
to know, at least from the record, whether the Law School was in
fact employing a quota, the majority was willing to presume that
it was not while the dissent was prepared to presume that it
was.0 9 The dissent's approach was closer to strict scrutiny as
traditionally understood.
It is not clear why the majority chose to dilute the strict
standard of review in this case; however, there are several
possible explanations. Perhaps it believed that the Michigan Law
School program was in fact constitutionally designed and
implemented but that its constitutionality simply had not been or
could not be conclusively shown; hence, the majority was willing
to tip the scales in favor of the school through a presumption of
good faith and a large dose of deference. Or perhaps the Court
recognized that under traditional strict scrutiny, university
policies employing race would be constantly subject to legal
challenge and perhaps difficult to justify even if honestly
designed and implemented. The Court may have concluded that,
given that some use of racial preferences was constitutionally
permissible, it would be too burdensome and inefficient to require
universities to be in the position of constantly having to litigate
the matter, and, hence, a buffer zone of deference was needed to
protect against this threat. Alternatively, perhaps the Court
believed that admitting a critical mass of minority students was
a compelling interest but that doing so could rarely, if ever,
survive traditionally applied narrow tailoring analysis. For
whatever reason, the Court changed the rules of the game.
307.
See id. at 2371-73 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
308.
See id. at 2339, 2346.
309.
See id. at 2342 (concluding that the Law School's admission program "does not
operate as a quota"); id. at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the critical mass
approach as "a delusion used by the Law School to mask its attempt to make race an
automatic factor in most instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from
quotas").
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Based on evidence in the record, the Court could have made
a more persuasive case for why diversity is a compelling interest,
why admission of a critical mass of minority students is a
compelling interest, and why pursuing racial diversity without
wholly sacrificing academic selectivity is a compelling interest.
The Court simply did not bother to make that case in a
lawyerlike manner. Instead, it cited or quoted from a few briefs
and secondary sources, indicated that useful information had
been entered into evidence at trial, and stated over and over
again that it deferred to the judgments and good faith of
educational institutions.31 ° Perhaps the case was argued too late
in the Term (April 1) to allow the Court to write a detailed, wellcrafted opinion given the press of other cases, although even at
that late date it still had approximately three months remaining.
For whatever reason, quite apart from the result, the opinion was
a disappointment. It should have been much stronger.
Ultimately, however, institutions of higher education can breathe
a collective sigh of relief. The Court appears to have given them
broad leeway to employ racial preferences without significant
risk of liability, although there are still some issues to be
resolved. Nevertheless, despite the deference granted by the
Court, if the past is a prologue, some institution in quest of racial
diversity will overstep these generous boundaries and will be
faced with a serious legal challenge.
Whether under a diversity rationale or a minority leadership
rationale, educational institutions are provided a significant
degree of leeway in employing racial preferences. This offers
significant social benefits, but it is hardly cost free. It gives
universities little incentive to develop race neutral alternatives. 1
It may send out the message that all minority students are
beneficiaries of racial preferences. 12 It may provide a disincentive
to minority students to strive to fulfill their potential.31 3 It may
lead to race-based resentment and hostility."4 It may engender a
patronizing approach by majoritarian society and culture toward
minorities.3"5 It may cement racial preferences into the social

See id. at 2336, 2339, 2340-41.
310.
See id. at 2373-74 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
311.
312.
See id. at 2362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
313.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 797 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Boggs, J.,
dissenting), affd, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
314.
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2374 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
315.
See id. at 2350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Frederick Douglass, What the Black Man Wants: An Address Delivered in Boston,
Massachusetts (Jan. 26, 1865), in 4 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 59, 68 (John W.
Blassingame & John R. McKivigan eds., 1991)).
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structure as a fundamental entitlement immune from removal
regardless of any change in circumstances.816 These are serious
costs not to be taken lightly. The Court has apparently
concluded, probably correctly, that as a matter of constitutional
law these costs are worth the potential reward. It is now for the
political branches and the institutions that develop and
administer racial preference plans to bear these costs in mind as
they move to implement Grutter and Gratz.

316.

See id. at 2370 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

